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ARTICLE
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE INSANITY
DEFENSE: PROPOSALS TO REFORM
POST-ACQUITTAL COMMITMENT
LAWS*
James W. Ellis**
Legislatures currently face a spate of proposals concerning the civil com-
mitment of criminal defendants who have been acquitted by reason of in-
sanity.' This outpouring of suggested reforms has been occasioned by the
political reaction to the controversial acquittal in the Hinckley trial and em-
boldened by a United States Supreme Court decision that grants considera-
ble latitude to legislators on this topic.2 Legislators will find some common
themes in these competing recommendations, but also some important dif-
ferences. This Article analyzes the most prominent proposals.
* © James W. Ellis, 1986. This Article is an expanded version of a paper delivered at a
conference on mental health law sponsored by the University of Miami School of Law.
Portions of it will appear in somewhat different form in a collection of papers from that
conference.
** Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. A.B., Occidental College, 1968; J.D.,
University of California at Berkeley, 1974. Professor Ellis served as Law Reporter, American
Bar Association Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Part VII (Commitment of Nonre-
sponsibility Acquittees).
1. The defense has long carried the label of "insanity." This terminology has increas-
ingly created confusion as the word has taken on. different meanings and connotations. One
difficulty is that it appears to address only mentally ill defendants, while in fact, the defense
encompasses mentally retarded individuals as well. See, e.g., In re Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d 419,
584 P.2d 524, 149 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1978); Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 432-41 (1985). The American Bar Association's
new Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards call for abandonment of the term "insanity"
and its replacement with "mental nonresponsibility," because "[tierms like 'insanity' and 'the
criminally insane' conjure up visions of beastlike derangement" and are thus "offensive and
stigmatizing." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 7 & Introduction to Part VI (2d
ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA Standards]. See George, The American Bar Association's
Mental Health Standards: An Overview, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 338, 362 n.176 (1985).
While in full agreement with the motivation for the Standards' change in terminology, this
Article will continue to use the archaic, but more familiar, label of "insanity."
2. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
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Although the criminal defense of insanity has long engendered substantial
controversy, the focus has been directed more frequently at the defense itself
rather than the consequences of its successful assertion. In academic circles,
the dispute has most frequently and prominently centered around almost
metaphysical debates about the concept of blameworthiness and the propri-
ety of labelling acts as "criminal" when the moral responsibility of the actor
was in doubt because of his mental condition.3 "Rivers of ink, mountains of
printer's lead, forests of paper have been expended"4 debating "the volition
prong" and "the cognitive prong" of the defense of insanity, and the relative
merits of insanity as an affirmative defense, as contrasted to exclusive reli-
ance on the requirement of mens rea.
These debates are useful in a number of ways,5 but they do not address
directly the crucial political issue of whether a person acquitted because of
his mental state is "getting away with" criminal acts and thus escaping pun-
ishment.6 The public's concern is less with ascertaining whether blame
properly can be assigned to a particular defendant than with determining
when he will get out. And the delusions of law professors and mental disa-
bility professionals to the contrary notwithstanding, it is the public's concern
that drives the debate on possible changes in the insanity defense.
While legislators routinely invite the views of psychiatric experts and legal
scholars at hearings on proposals to change the legal rules,7 it cannot be
doubted that even if these experts were to speak with a single voice endors-
ing the legal status quo, their polite reception would be followed by the en-
actment of changes demanded by a public dissatisfied with the perceived
3. The literature on this issue is voluminous. Among recent contributions, see, e.g., H.
FINGARETTE & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979);
N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982); A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY &
MORALITY (1984); W. WINSLADE & J. Ross, THE INSANITY PLEA (1983).
4. Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514, 516 (1968).
5. Their principal importance, of course, is in directing our attention to the question of
the appropriate use of the criminal sanction in cases involving mental disability. They also
serve to illuminate moral questions as they relate to public policy, to instruct first year law
students in the methodology of legal reasoning, and to provide the opportunity for the occa-
sional turn of a felicitous phrase, as in the American Psychiatric Association's observation that
"[t]he line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper
than that between twilight and dusk." American Psychiatric Association, Statement on the
Insanity Defense (Dec. 1982), in ISSUES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 7, 16 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as APA Statement].
6. Cf H. STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP?: DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO
STAND TRIAL (1979).
7. See, e.g., Limiting the Insanity Defense: Hearings on S. 818 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); The Insanity
Defense. Hearings on S. 818 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982); Insanity Defense in Federal Courts: Hearings on H.R. 6783 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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workings of the insanity defense.' There is reason to believe that the public's
perception of the consequences of an acquittal by reason of insanity is inac-
curate, 9 but it cannot be doubted that the public's principal concern is the
likelihood that an acquitted defendant will be released from custody more
quickly than the public deems desirable.l° Indeed, the popular dissatisfac-
tion with other issues, such as allocation of the burden of proof on the in-
sanity issue and the insanity standard, is fueled ultimately by concern over
the possibility that too many defendants are "getting off," which to many in
the general public means "going free.""
Therefore, it was not surprising that when an outcry followed the acquit-
tal of John W. Hinckley, Jr., for the attempted assassination of the Presi-
dent,2 legislative attention should turn to the issue of disposition of insanity
acquittees. Following the Hinckley verdict, the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation and the American Bar Association formulated positions on the dis-
8. An example demonstrating the predominance of the political impulses in this area is
the enactment of "Guilty But Mentally Ill" statutes in a number of states. Disapproval by the
American Bar Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and most commentators
who addressed the topic did not stay the hands of legislators bent on their enactment. See
generally ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-6.10(b) and accompanying commentary; APA
Statement, supra note 5, at 14 ("IT]he American Psychiatric Association is extremely skeptical
of this approach."); Hermann & Sor, Convicting or Confining? Alternative Directions in In-
sanity Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally Ill Versus New Rules for Release of Insanity Acquit-
tees, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REV. 499; Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose
Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494 (1985).
9. For a review of the relevant literature, see Steadman & Braff, Defendants Not Guilty
by Reason of Insanity, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 109 (J. Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983).
10. See, e.g., Senator Orrin Hatch's list of reasons why he believes the insanity defense to
be "obsolete:"
First, no longer may acquittees be placed indefinitely in a facility for the criminally
insane. They must be treated comparably to a civilly committed patient. Secondly,
our psychiatric hospitals are no longer warehouses for prolonged storage of socially
unacceptable deviants. Thirdly, a loosening of the insanity defense and tightening of
civil commitment standards have resulted in the placement within our psychiatric
hospitals of some individuals acquitted of bizarre sociopathic activities who cannot
be "treated"; and yet must and should be confined for the protection of society. Fi-
nally, standards for release of acquittees require a psychiatric prediction of continu-
ing dangerousness, a feat that is, at best, chimerical.
Limiting the Insanity Defense: Hearings on S. 818 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1982).
11. A national public opinion poll taken at the outset of the Hinckley trial revealed that
87% of the sample "believed that too many murderers were using insanity pleas to avoid jail."
L. CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 103
(1984) (citing an Associated Press/NBC News poll). See also Margulies, The "Pandemonium
Between the Mad and the Bad:" Procedures for the Commitment and Release of Insanity Ac-
quittees after Jones v. United States, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 793, 794 n.3 (1984) (citing New
York Times poll in which 75% of the respondents opposed the insanity defense).
12. See L. CAPLAN, supra note 11, at 101-27.
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position of such defendants,13 as did the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and a commission convened by the
National Mental Health Association. Also during this period, the United
States Supreme Court issued a ruling on some of the constitutional issues
involved in commitment of insanity acquittees, 14. and Congress passed the
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984."5
Each of these proposals may be considered as possible models by state
legislators interested in reforming commitment laws for insanity acquittees.
Two earlier models, the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code and
Oregon's Psychiatric Security Review Board, may also attract legislative at-
tention. After a brief review of the historical background of the issue, this
Article will analyze the Supreme Court's decision, the proposal from the
APA, the new federal statute, the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standards and the Model Statute proposed by the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. This Article will also discuss the provisions of the Model
Penal Code, Oregon's system, and the recommendations of the National
Commission on the Insanity Defense.' 6
I. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF ACQUITTEES
Since the inception of the insanity defense, it has always been assumed
13. Both the ABA and APA acknowledged that their new positions were occasioned, in
part, by reaction to the Hinckley case. The Supreme Court, in Jones, did not. 463 U.S. 354
(1983).
14. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
15. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2057-
68.
16. There is a voluminous literature that preceded these recent events on the subject of the
commitment of insanity acquittees. See, e.g., Morris, Acquittal by Reason of Insanity: Develop-
ments in the Law, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE 65-108 (J. Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983); D. WEXLER, CRIMINAL
COMMITMENTS AND DANGEROUS MENTAL PATIENTS: LEGAL ISSUES OF CONFINEMENT,
TREATMENT, AND RELEASE (Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health 1976); German & Singer, Punishing
the Not Guilty. Hospitalization of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1011 (1976); Hamann, The Confinement and Release of Persons Acquitted by Reason of
Insanity, 4 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 55 (1966); Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Ac-
quitted by Reason of Insanity, 38 TEX. L. REV. 849 (1960); Weiner, Not Guilty by Reason of
Insanity: A Sane Approach, 56 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 1057 (1980); Note, Commitment Follow-
ing an Insanity Acquittal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 605 (1981); Note, Rulesfor an Exceptional Class:
The Commitment and Release of Persons Acquitted of Violent Offenses by Reason of Insanity,
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281 (1982); Comment, Compulsory Commitment Following a Successful
Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 409 (1961). For more recent analysis, see Hermann,
Automatic Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees: Constitutional Dimensions, 14
RUTGERS L.J. 667 (1983); Singer, The Aftermath of an Insanity Acquittal: The Supreme
Court's Recent Decision in Jones v. United States, 477 ANNALS 114 (1985); Wexler, Redefining
the Insanity Problem, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 528 (1985).
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that acquittal by reason of mental disability would not entitle the defendant
to automatic (or even eventual) freedom. Blackstone, after describing the
circumstances under which an insane person was exculpated, declared that
"as they are not answerable for their actions, they should not be permitted
the liberty of acting unless under proper control; and in particular they
ought not to be suffered to go loose, to the terror of the king's subjects."1 7
The harshness of Norman and medieval punishments was mitigated for in-
sane defendants in the form of "consultation" with the King, who had the
power to waive the penalty in the interests of justice and also to determine
the insane offender's disposition. Indeed the fiction that setting the length
and location of post-acquittal confinement was a royal prerogative was not
abandoned in England until 1964.18
But whether the actual decision about disposition was made by the sover-
eign or by the courts, it is clear that "treatment" as we know it was not the
purpose of the confinement. As Blackstone observed, "It was the doctrine of
our ancient law that persons deprived of their reason might be confined till
they recovered their senses, without waiting for the forms of a commission
or other special authority from the crown: and now, by the vagrant acts, a
method is chalked out for imprisoning, chaining and sending them to their
proper homes."' 9 The possibility of committing insanity acquittees to
mental institutions rather than prisons was codified in the wake of Hadfield's
Case in 1800.20 But even then, the principal focus remained on
confinement. 2 '
In this country, there was a similar assumption that acquittal upon
grounds of insanity at the time of the offense would lead to confinement for
the protection of society. Perhaps the most prominent case in the early de-
cades of the new republic was that of Richard Lawrence, who attempted to
assassinate President Andrew Jackson in 1835.22 Lawrence's obvious
mental illness led the jury, after five minutes of deliberation, to acquit him by
reason of insanity, following which he spent the remaining quarter century
17. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *25.
18. 1 N. WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND: THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
194 (1968).
19. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 17.
20. Criminal Lunatics Act, 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 94, 5 Stat. 393; Moran, The Origin
of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial for Treason of James Hadfield (1800), 19 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 487 (1985); N. WALKER, supra note 18, at 78-81. See also S. GLEUCK, MENTAL
DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 393 (1925); R. SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE: INSANITY
AND RESPONSIBILITY IN VICTORIAN TRIALS 20 (1981).
21. The statute announced its purpose as "the safe custody of persons charged with of-
fenses." N. WALKER, supra note 18, at 78. For a fuller discussion of the statute and its histor-
ical context, see Moran, supra note 20.
22. See United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887 (C.C.D.C. 1835) (No. 15,577).
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of his life at what is now St. Elizabeths Hospital.2 3 Eventually, most states
codified rules providing for automatic confinement with extremely burden-
some standards and procedures for obtaining release from confinement.24
With few exceptions, nineteenth and early twentieth century American
courts upheld statutes which provided for the automatic and indeterminate
confinement of defendants who were successful in pleading insanity.25
Challenges to the assumptions underlying automatic commitment accom-
panied the more general recognition of the civil rights of mentally disabled
people in the 1960's and 1970'S.26 Particularly influential in crystallizing
dissatisfaction with the automatic commitment system were reports by the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York,27 and the opinion by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Bolton v.
Harris,28 holding that equal protection required that insanity acquittees re-
ceive procedural protections roughly equivalent to those afforded general
civil commitment patients.29
The movement toward equivalence of treatment required a substantial de-
23. Id.; J. CLARKE, AMERICAN ASSASSINS: THE DARKER SIDE OF POLITICS 195-98
(1982); Zonana, The First Presidential Assassination Attempt, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 309 (1984).
24. For a survey of state laws in the 1920s, see S. GLUECK, supra note 20, at 391-412
(1925). By 1954, the majority of states required no additional procedure beyond the insanity
acquittal to warrant commitment. H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DE-
FENSE 365-75 (1954). Most states provided that mental facilities lacked the ability to release
acquittees without approval of a court, commission, or the governor. Id. at 376-84. (A provi-
sion requiring approval by the legislature before an acquittee could be released was declared
unconstitutional because it denied the right of habeas corpus. In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48
S.E. 789 (1904).) Almost all of the statutes placed the burden of persuasion on the acquittee to
demonstrate that he was no longer insane and, in some states, that he was not dangerous. H.
WEIHOFEN, supra at 376-84.
25. See, e.g., Ex parte Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 P. 769 (1930); People v. Dubina, 304
Mich. 363, 8 N.W.2d 99 (1943). See generally H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 24, at 365-84, and
cases cited therein. But see Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1 (1875) (statute unconstitutional
because it provides no inquiry into current mental condition); In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48
S.E. 789 (1904) (statute denied due process where it lacked notice, adjudication by a court, or
any form of review).
26. See THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 404-05 (S. Brakel & R. Rock rev. ed.
1971). See generally Wald & Friedman, The Politics of Mental Health Advocacy in the United
States, 1 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 137 (1978).
27. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MENTAL ILLNESS AND
DUE PROCESS (1962); ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MENTAL
ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND ACQUITTED DEFENDANTS (1979); ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DE-
FENDANT (1968).
28. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
29. Id. at 651. The view that insanity acquittees were entitled to procedural protections
equivalent to those received by general civil commitment patients appeared to be supported by
language in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), which required equivalence between gen-
[Vol. 35:961
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parture from past procedures for acquittees since civil mental patients were
entitled to greater protections than they had received in past decades.3" In
particular, courts and legislatures31 recognized rights to a commitment hear-
ing which included representation by counsel in all cases (and assistance by a
mental disability professional expert in many), with the burden of persuasion
on the state to prove the individual's dangerousness to himself or to others,
to individualized treatment or habilitation in the least restrictive alternative,
and to periodic review of his continuing need for commitment.3 2 These new
laws meant that initiation of civil commitment proceedings did not automat-
ically result in confinement in a mental hospital and, that even if committed,
the confinement of most patients would not be permanent or of very long
duration.33 The new legal structure for general civil patients was inconsis-
tent with the previous expectation that insanity acquittees would be confined
automatically and permanently, and this was of particular concern in those
states which used general civil commitment procedures for the confinement
of acquittees.34
Nevertheless, this tension between new legal procedures and enduring
public expectations about the confinement of acquittees did not produce any
widespread changes in commitment procedures prior to the Hinckley case.
In a few states, legislators responded to local insanity defense cases which
achieved public notoriety with a somewhat oblique change in dispositional
alternatives, the "Guilty But Mentally Ill" verdict. But this was only an
attempt to reduce the number of acquittees rather than to assure the secure
eral commitment patients and those criminal defendants found permanently incompetent to
stand trial.
30. The case for equivalence between acquittees and general civil patients is argued force-
fully by Professor Grant Morris. See Morris, supra note 16.
31. For a discussion of the political process in enacting one such statute, see E. BARDACH,
THE SKILL FACTOR IN POLITICS: REPEALING THE MENTAL COMMITMENT LAWS IN CALI-
FORNIA (1972).
32. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378
(M.D. Ala. 1974); Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473, 378 A.2d 553 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 43-1-2 to 43-1-25 (Repl. 1984). For model statutes embodying many of these provisions,
see Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for Change, Civil Commitment, 2
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 73 (1977); Model Right to Developmental Disabilities Services
Act, in DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 409, 425 (B. Sales,
D. Powell & R. Van Duizend eds. 1982); Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275 (1983), reprinted in IssuEs IN
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 57 (American Psychiatric Ass'n 1984).
33. For a study of the practical effect of these new laws, see C. WARREN, THE COURT OF
LAST RESORT: MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW (1982).
34. In 1981, 19 states used general commitment procedures for acquittees. Note, Com-
mitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 605 n.3 (1981).
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confinement of those who were acquitted.35 The Hinckley acquittal changed
the situation radically, and the first vehicle for change was the otherwise
obscure appeal of Michael Jones in the District of Columbia.
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN THE JONES CASE
It is certainly ironic that Jones v. United States3 6 became the focus for this
politically charged issue, since it did not involve a notorious criminal or a
crime which outraged the community. Michael Jones was arrested in a de-
partment store in 1975 and charged with attempting to steal a jacket. It is
difficult to imagine many criminal acts more obscure or less threatening to
the public's sense of security. The fact that thrust Michael Jones into the
legal spotlight, and thus pushed him into the path of the Supreme Court's
onrushing reaction against the rights of mental patients who might be
thought dangerous, was his acquittal by reason of insanity. The intervening
event that placed in controversy his uncontested37 entitlement to a verdict of
acquittal was John Hinckley, Jr.'s acquittal on charges of attempting to as-
sassinate President Reagan. Jones and Hinckley had two things in common:
mental illness and the fact that they were both acquitted and confined under
the same District of Columbia statute.
Jones had been confined at St. Elizabeths Hospital for eight years before
his case became a legal cause celebre. In the litigation that eventually
reached the Supreme Court, his lawyers claimed that he was entitled to a
commitment hearing at which the government had the burden of persuasion,
because he would have been released years earlier had he been convicted
rather than acquitted. Thus, the claim was that the government's right to
deny him a hearing that all other patients are entitled to ended at the expira-
tion of the sentence he could have received following a conviction. Inherent
in this contention is the basic proposition that the prosecution constitution-
ally could not gain greater authority over a defendant through an acquittal
than it would have received from a conviction. This was a simple proposi-
tion, supported by the preponderance of scholarly commentary on the sub-
ject 38 as well as a substantial body of case law.39 The District of Columbia's
35. These expectations have not been borne out in practice. See Evaluating Michigan's
Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 77 (1982).
36. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
37. The prosecution did not contest Jones' plea of insanity and stipulated to the relevant
facts in the trial court. 463 U.S. at 360.
38. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 16; Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal,
94 HARV. L. REV. 605 (1981); Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class. The Commitment and
Release of Persons Acquitted of Violent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281
(1982).
39. See, e.g., Benham v. Edwards, 768 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated sub nom. Ledbet-
[Vol. 35:96.1
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Court of Appeals rejected Jones' appeal,' and the United States Supreme
Court agreed by a vote of five to four.4 1 Analysis of the Court's opinion
requires an inquiry into the justification for treating acquittees differently
from other individuals whose civil commitment is sought by the government.
A. Automatic Commitment
The initial issue in the disposition of insanity acquittees is whether auto-
matic commitment should follow the criminal court's verdict. Automatic
commitment is politically attractive, since it assures the public that a defend-
ant who is successful in pleading insanity for a criminal act he committed
will not, at least for some time, be returned to society and thus pose a danger
to public safety. Acquittal, however, renders punishment constitutionally
unacceptable, requiring some other justification for the defendant's contin-
ued confinement. 42 The only available rationale is that acquittees remain
dangerous due to a mental disability and therefore can be automatically
committed for treatment of that disability, or simply to incapacitate them-
as the Court in Jones put it, to "protect him and society from his potential
dangerousness. '43 But as a logical (and thus constitutional) matter, this re-
quires a conclusion that all acquittees are prospectively dangerous. The con-
stitutional principle of equal protection" requires that different treatment of
persons committed after acquittal and other committed persons be based on
some difference between the two groups.4" The conclusion that the govern-
ter v. Benham, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569
(1974). But see Warren v. Harvey, 632 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1980).
40. A panel of that court had originally rejected Jones' appeal, and then reversed itself
after a rehearing. 396 A.2d 183 (1978), rev'd on rehearing, 411 A.2d 624 (1980). Finally the
entire court heard the appeal and rejected it. 432 A.2d 364 (1981).
41. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
42. The Supreme Court has held that "due process requires that the nature and duration
of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is com-
mitted." Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
43. 463 U.S. at 368.
44. The principle embodied in the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause is ap-
plicable to the federal government (and thus the District of Columbia) through the fifth
amendment's due process clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
45. The weight of the government's burden in establishing the difference between the
groups varies with the nature of the case. Cases involving "fundamental rights" require that
the government demonstrate a "compelling interest" in treating groups of people differently.
See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 528-37 (3d ed.
1986). The majority in Jones employed the more deferential standard for measuring the gov-
ernment's interest and thereby implicitly suggested that freedom from confinement in a mental
hospital does not constitute a "fundamental right." 463 U.S. at 362 n.10. This conclusion is
questionable and may produce a variety of undesirable results in cases that do not involve
insanity acquittees, but discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article. See Mar-
gulies, supra note 11, at 814-18. It is sufficient for these purposes to demonstrate that there are
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ment need not prove the prospective dangerousness of insanity acquittees in
a separate proceeding (commitment hearing) requires the assumption that
all such acquittees have been demonstrated to be dangerous in the course of
their criminal trials. However, the determination in the criminal case that
the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity does not support this
conclusion.46
Insanity acquittees are found not guilty at their criminal trials because of
the effect of their mental disability as it existed and manifested itself at the
time of the offense. However, a substantial period of time will have elapsed
between the crime and the trial, and that period will be even longer when, as
is frequently the case, the defendant's competence to stand trial has also
been called into question. By the time the criminal court issues its verdict,"
the defendant may no longer be mentally ill,48 or if he is still mentally dis-
abled, he may no longer be dangerous. These changes may occur naturally
or as a result of treatment or habilitation. In either event, a factual finding
about a defendant's mental state at the time of the crime may be inadequate
as a description of his mental state at the time of the criminal court's
verdict.4 9
It is now commonly accepted that psychiatrists and other mental disabil-
ity professionals lack the ability to predict future dangerousness with a high
degree of accuracy.50 Yet whatever difficulties these professionals confront,
not sufficient differences between insanity acquittees and other patients to constitute a "ra-
tional basis" for distinction, and that procedural due process is denied when acquittees do not
receive a full hearing on their present mental condition and prospective dangerousness.
46. The equal protection argument is parallel to analysis under the due process clause
requiring the same result. Since commitment involves a deprivation of liberty, it must be sup-
ported by adequate justification and accomplished with appropriate procedural protections.
The justification for an acquittee's confinement must be sufficiently related to its "nature and
duration." See supra note 42. Commitment premised on prospective dangerousness must be
supported, therefore, by a finding that such dangerous conduct is likely from a particular ac-
quittee. And the procedural component of due process requires that such a finding must be
based on an individual determination. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom
v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
47. Some insanity acquittals result from plea bargaining rather than verdicts following
trials. See, e.g., infra note 91. Even in these cases, the mental condition of the defendant may
have changed since the occurrence of the criminal act.
48. It is less likely that the passage of time or provision of habilitation will render a previ-
ously mentally retarded defendant nonretarded. But as with mentally ill defendants, those
who are mentally retarded may no longer be dangerous at the time of conclusion of the trial.
See generally Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 1.
49. This is not a novel observation. See Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1 (1875).
50. For insightful analysis of the research findings, see Monahan, The Predictions of Vio-
lent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10
(1984). See also Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1984). Cf
Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1974); Ennis
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they are surely in a much better position to achieve accuracy than are crimi-
nal trial courts, whose focus is limited to a single past incident and the
mental state that accompanied and produced it. It is thus difficult to con-
clude that that verdict can itself serve as an accurate prediction of future
dangerousness. Without such a prediction, a commitment hearing to deter-
mine whether the basis for commitment exists would seem constitutionally
required.
Another flaw in the assumptions underlying automatic commitment is
that some acquittees may not have been dangerous even at the time of the
criminal offense. The type of danger presented would have to be sufficiently
serious to outweigh the individual's liberty interests in order to justify com-
mitment. Some criminal offenses involve no danger or threat to the safety of
others. Attempting to steal a jacket is an example of such an offense, as are
embezzlement, fraud, and perjury. The law provides for the punishment of
these offenses, but the likelihood that an individual will commit them in the
future is not a sufficient basis for civil commitment, which typically requires
demonstration of imminent likelihood of serious harm to self or others.51
Therefore, whatever the strength of the government's claim that an insanity
acquittal for a crime of violence or potential violence demonstrates prospec-
tive dangerousness, it does not extend to acquittees whose offense gives no
indication of even past violent propensities.
Finally, the criminal court's verdict may be an inadequate predictor of
future conduct because jurisdictions differ in their requirements of proof to
support a verdict of insanity. Some jurisdictions place the burden of persua-
sion regarding the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense on the
defendant, requiring him to demonstrate (at varying levels of certainty) that
he lacked the requisite understanding of his actions or ability to control
them. Other jurisdictions require for conviction that the state have proven,
often beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was not insane at the
time of the offense. In these latter jurisdictions, a verdict of acquittal by
reason of insanity may merely indicate that the finder of fact entertained a
& Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974).
The United States Supreme Court, confronted with these research findings, declined to rule
that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness were so unreliable that they could not be used in
support of claims of aggravation in death penalty cases. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-
903 (1983). The majority in Barefoot held that the fact that a majority of psychiatrists believed
such predictions to be unreliable should not preclude trial courts from hearing testimony from
those mental health professionals who believed that they could predict accurately future vio-
lent behavior.
51. See supra note 32.
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reasonable doubt about the defendant's mental condition.52 In such cases,
there has not even been an affirmative finding that the defendant was men-
tally ill or mentally retarded at the time of the offense. A judge's or juror's
doubt about the certainty with which the state has proven its case regarding
the defendant's insanity does not constitute a finding that he was in fact
mentally ill or mentally retarded. It cannot, therefore, be taken as a substi-
tute for such a finding in a civil commitment hearing.
The Jones majority dismissed two of these factors and limited its holding
in a way that avoided the third.53 The Court held that the District of Co-
lumbia's statute, which provided acquittees with the opportunity for a re-
lease hearing after fifty days of post-acquittal confinement 54  (and
periodically thereafter) did not violate the Constitution. The fact that the
District allowed release hearings distinguishes the case from statutes provid-
ing for completely unreviewed automatic commitment. But since the Dis-
trict of Columbia acquittee bears the burden of establishing his
nondangerousness (or recovery from his mental disability) at those hearings,
the Court's ruling upholds the constitutionality of denying acquittees the
procedural protections afforded civil patients.5 5 The majority accomplished
this by determining that the finding of acquittal by reason of insanity pro-
vides enough information about the acquittee to justify treating him differ-
ently from civil commitment patients. 56
The Court found little difficulty in approving the implicit prediction of
dangerousness drawn from the criminal verdict under the District of Colum-
bia system. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, observed that under the
52. See Morris, supra note 16, at 68.
53. The Court's holding only extends to commitment systems in which the defendant bore
the burden of persuasion at the previous criminal trial, and thus proved by at least a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he had been mentally disabled at the time of the offense. There-
fore, the decision does not speak to the constitutionality of automatic commitment following a
trial at which an insanity verdict could be reached if the judge or jury merely entertained a
reasonable doubt as to sanity, i.e., a system in which the prosecution had the burden of proof
on the issue of insanity. 463 U.S. at 363-66. See Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 528, 534-35 n.37 (1985); ABA Standards, supra note 1, at Intro. to Part
VII.
54. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(2) (1981). Acquittees can also obtain their release at
similar hearings, which they can request at six-month intervals, at which they also bear the
burden of persuasion. An acquittee can also be released if the hospital superintendent certifies
that the acquittee is no longer mentally disabled or dangerous and if the court agrees with this
conclusion. Id. § 24-301(e).
55. Typical modern civil commitment statutes for general mental health patients require
the state to bear the burden of persuasion on periodic review of the patients' need for contin-
ued commitment. Van Duizend, McGraw & Keilitz, An Overview of State Involuntary Com-
mitment Statutes, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 335 (1984).
56. But see German & Singer, supra note 16, at 118.
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District's statute an insanity acquittal establishes that the defendant commit-
ted the act for which he was prosecuted and that he did so as a result of
mental illness. "Congress has determined that these findings constitute an
adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous and mentally ill
person. . . . We cannot say that it was unreasonable . . . for Congress to
make this determination.""7 Thus the Court's opinion does not even address
the fact that the trial court's determinations regarding mental illness and the
resulting criminal act refer to a point in time substantially removed from the
situation at the time of the acquittal (and even further removed from the
time of subsequent hearings on periodic review). The fact that the predictive
power of past events and conditions dims with the passage of intervening
years is not acknowledged or even addressed by the Court's opinion.
The effect of the passage of time upon the accuracy of predictions of fu-
ture dangerousness is a subject that the available empirical literature ad-
dresses in some detail.5 But the Court's majority was disdainful of
invitations to consult the state of current scientific knowledge on predictions
of dangerousness. 9 Counsel for Jones had argued that the statute had no
support in the empirical literature, but the majority dismissed this argument
in a footnote: "We do not agree with the suggestion that Congress' power to
legislate in this area depends on the research conducted by the psychiatric
community." After quoting from previous opinions about the uncertainty of
psychiatric diagnoses, the footnote concludes: "The lesson we have drawn is
not that government may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather
that courts should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative
judgments."6
This is a startling lesson to draw. The fact that unchallenged empirical
research has shown the fallibility of psychiatric diagnoses and predictions of
57. 463 U.S. at 364.
58. See J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (National
Inst. of Mental Health 1981).
59. The Jones Court's endorsement of unsupported presumptions and disregard for scien-
tific knowledge on predictability of dangerousness have been widely criticized. See, e.g., Her-
mann, supra note 16, at 667; Margulies, supra note 11; Monahan, supra note 50; Schmidt,
Supreme Court Decision Making on Insanity Acquittees Does Not Depend on Research Con-
ducted by the Behavioral Science Community: Jones v. United States, 12 J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
507 (1984); Singer, supra note 16; Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea
Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494. 524 (1985); The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. REV. 70, 94 (1983); Note, Indefinite Commitment of Insanity
Aquittees and Due Process Considerations: Jones v. United States, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 1334 (1983); Comment, Jones v. United States: Automatic Commitment of Individuals
Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 68 MINN. L. REV. 822 (1984).
60. 463 U.S. at 365 n. 13. This shifts the debate to the reasonableness of the legislative
judgment at issue. But the Court in Jones accepted as "reasonable" a seriously flawed congres-
sional enactment.
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future behavior leads the Court to conclude that it is acceptable to base pre-
dictions of great consequence on presumptions that are even less reliable.
Since the judgments of mental disability professionals form an imperfect
foundation for such predictions, 61 it is acceptable, in the Court's view, for
legislatures to make categorical predictions based on marginally relevant
facts determined by trial courts that were litigating a different issue. In man-
dating deference to legislative judgments in this area, the Court does require
that these be "reasonable," but in giving its approval to a legislative scheme
that is unsupportable by the existing knowledge about predictions of future
violent conduct, the majority makes it hard to imagine what an "unreasona-
ble" legislative approach would look like.
This would be troubling enough if the Court had limited the allowable
inference of future dangerousness to cases in which the defendant had been
found to have committed an act that involved some form of violent conduct.
But Mr. Jones had only been charged with attempted petit larceny.
Whatever the predictive power regarding future dangerous behavior of a vio-
lent felony, such as Hinckley's, the reliability of predictions based on acts
which were themselves nonviolent property offenses must be substantially
lower. The Court's attempt to justify predictions based on these lesser of-
fenses is not persuasive. The majority first observed that its previous deci-
sions had never held "that 'violence,' however that term might be defined, is
a prerequisite for a constitutional commitment."62 But this observation mis-
characterizes the issue. The contention is not that an act of violence, which
would presumably not include attempted shoplifting under any definition,
must be a prerequisite to commitment, but rather that an act which was
totally unrelated to personal violence cannot support a prediction of future
violent behavior.
Since the finding by the trial court that a defendant engaged in nonviolent
conduct tells us nothing reliable about future violent conduct of the acquit-
tee, it cannot support a presumption sufficient to deny him a commitment
hearing at which the government is required to prove that he is subject to
lawful commitment. Systems of automatic commitment like the District of
Columbia's are a short-circuit of the constitutional requirement that individ-
uals can be deprived of their liberty only after a hearing. This is justifiable
61. This is not to say that mental disability professionals lack any ability to predict dan-
gerousness. Under some limited circumstances, such professionals can make some useful pre-
dictions about some kinds of behavior. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 50. But there is a
consensus among researchers that such predictions will be accurate far less frequently than the
general public (and perhaps the judiciary) believes.
62. 463 U.S. at 365.
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only if we have learned something about the individual at the criminal trial
that gives us a comparable assurance about his future conduct.
The Jones majority feebly attempts to persuade us that we have learned
enough about Mr. Jones to make a reliable prediction about his propensity
for future violent conduct because "crimes of theft frequently may result in
violence from the efforts of the criminal to escape or the victim to protect
property or the police to apprehend the fleeing criminal., 63 Professor John
Monahan has correctly observed that this argument proves too much:
Should such a Pickwickian definition be extended from insanity
cases to general civil commitment, we may witness a reversal of the
national trend toward increased specificity in the dangerousness
criterion of commitment laws. The prediction of such "danger-
ous" acts as writing checks on insufficient funds, long thought to
be a parody of statutory interpretation, may once again suffice to
justify involuntary hospitalization."
If this level of likelihood of future violent behavior is an acceptable basis for
commitment without a hearing, the liberty of groups other than those ac-
quitted by reason of insanity is also threatened.
The Court has rejected what we have learned scientifically about predic-
tions of future dangerous conduct in favor of folk wisdom: "The fact that a
person has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a
criminal act certainly indicates dangerousness., 65 This nihilism is all the
more disturbing because the Court is willing to jeopardize an individual's
liberty, and even life itself,66 on the basis of predictions that are demonstra-
bly unreliable.
63. Id. at 365 n.14.
64. Monahan, supra note 50, at 13.
65. 463 U.S. at 364. Similarly, the majority invokes "common sense" in determining the
likelihood that the acquittee's mental disability has not abated or responded to treatment: "It
comports with common sense to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to
lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment." 463 U.S. at
366. It is true that the past existence of mental illness makes its current existence more likely
than if the individual had never been mentally ill. But common sense does not dictate that this
increased likelihood (as contrasted to the general population) warrants a "conclusion," partic-
ularly when the acquittee may have received treatment that ameliorated his condition during
the intervening months or years. Indeed, a defendant who was suffering from a severe mental
illness at the time of the offense is particularly likely to have been committed before trial to
evaluate (and possibly effect) competence. The possibility that this intervening commitment
was accompanied by effective treatment increases the likelihood that his or her mental condi-
tion has improved by the time of the trial. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
66. A few days after the Jones decision, the Court approved the use of unsupported psy-
chiatric predictions of dangerousness based on hypothetical questions in the penalty phase of
capital punishment cases. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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B. Burden of Persuasion
Perhaps the most controversial issue in the area of the commitment of
insanity acquittees is the allocation and magnitude of the burden of proof on
the issue of committability. For mental patients who are not in the criminal
justice system, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Constitu-
tion requires the government to bear the burden of persuasion by clear and
convincing evidence. In Addington v. Texas,67 the Court mandated this in-
termediate level of proof to reflect "the value society places on individual
liberty,"' 68 and thus to require a substantial degree of certainty that the pro-
posed patient met the statutory requirements for commitment.69 In a
number of cases, insanity acquittees had claimed that the Addington stan-
dard should be applied to their commitment hearings following acquittal.
Appellate courts divided on the question.7" The Supreme Court decided in
Jones that insanity acquittees were not entitled to the protections afforded by
Addington.
In Addington, the Court used the procedural due process balancing test
that it had announced in the context of disputes over Social Security disabil-
ity payments.7 ' Under this test, courts are to decide what procedural pro-
tections are constitutionally required by considering the nature of the
individual interest involved, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest
if the requested procedures are denied, the likelihood that those procedures
will reduce the risk of error, and the government's interest in avoiding the
requested procedures.7" The Jones majority concluded that several of these
factors were sufficiently different in cases involving insanity acquittees to
warrant a radically different result than that reached in ordinary civil com-
mitment cases.
According to the Jones majority, the individual interest in avoiding com-
mitment was smaller for acquittees than for other civil patients. Acquittees,
unlike other civil patients, would suffer little incremental stigmatization
67. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
68. Id. at 425.
69. On the problems inherent in quantifying burdens of persuasion, see Monahan & Wex
ler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV-
IOR 37 (1978).
70. Compare Benham v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511, 525 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated sub nom.
Ledbetter v. Benham, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983) (Addington is applicable), with Warren v. Harvey,
632 F.2d 925, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 902 (1980) (Addington is
distinguishable).
71. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
72. 424 U.S. at 335. For a discussion of the implementation of the Mathews v. Eldridge
test in the context of mental disability cases, see Teitelbaum & Ellis, The Liberty Interest of
Children: Due Process Rights and Their Application, 12 FAM. L.Q. 153, 174-202 (1978).
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from their commitment, the Court concluded, since they were already stig-
matized by the insanity verdict itself.73 This is certainly true, but its signifi-
cance is less clear. The greatest deprivation suffered by anyone who is civilly
committed is the loss of physical freedom,74 and this applies equally to in-
sanity acquittees and to other patients. The stigmatization suffered by gen-
eral civil commitment patients is doubtless real, but is surely the smaller part
of the liberty interest that they lose through commitment." Thus, for pur-
poses of the procedural due process calculus the individual interest of acquit-
tees in commitment cases is somewhat less than that of civil patients at stake
in Addington, although the difference is slight.
The Court also concluded that the risk of erroneous commitment is lower
for acquittees than for other patients. Any analysis of this element of the
due process test requires identification of what is meant by "error" in this
particular context. The majority opinion implies a definition by identifying
its concern as the possible commitment of someone whose actions are "in
fact within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable" and who is being
confined for mere "idiosyncratic behavior." 76 It then concluded that this is
a smaller risk for acquittees than for other potential patients because under
the District of Columbia statute the defendant himself proved that he had
committed a criminal act as a result of mental disability.77
As was true of the Court's analysis of the individual interest, this observa-
tion is accurate as far as it goes, but does not address the issue fully. The
hypothetical case in which an eccentric crank is wrongfully committed is not
the only type of error possible in a civil commitment system. It is also an
73. 463 U.S. at 367 n.16.
74. The Court has variously referred to this deprivation as a "massive curtailment of lib-
erty," Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972), and a "significant deprivation of liberty,"
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 425.
75. The Court has already recognized this fact in the general commitment case of Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601 (1979), where it observed that formal commitment is only a part of
"the public reaction to the mentally ill, for what is truly 'stigmatizing' is the symptomatology
of a mental or emotional illness."
76. 463 U.S. at 367 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-27). The Court earlier had fo-
cused its attention on the specter of states confining harmless individuals because of mere
eccentricity.
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from expo-
sure to those whose ways are different? One might as well ask if the State, to avoid
public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccen-
tric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the depri-
vation of a person's physical liberty.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
77. 463 U.S. at 367. It is noteworthy that this feature of the majority opinion may mean
that Jones is inapplicable in jurisdictions where the burden of persuasion at the criminal trial is
differently allocated. See supra note 53.
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error to commit a person who had been mentally disabled and, as a result,
committed a criminal act sometime in the past, but who is currently free
from mental disability or who will not constitute a danger to others if al-
lowed to remain at liberty. By failing to focus on the costs of this kind of
erroneous commitment, the Court's analysis ignores the risk that in a sub-
stantial number of cases insanity acquittees are committed based merely on a
finding that they were mentally disabled at the time of the (often much ear-
lier) criminal act. By failing to acknowledge the broader spectrum of possi-
ble errors, the Court underestimates the likelihood of erroneous decisions in
a system in which the government is not required to establish the acquittee's
current committability.
The Court does not directly address the next element of the due process
test, the likelihood that the requested procedures will reduce errors.7" The
difference between a system in which the government bears the burden of
persuasion by clear and convincing evidence that the individual currently
meets commitment criteria (general commitment) and one in which the pa-
tient must prove that he has "recovered" or is no longer dangerous (the
District of Columbia system for insanity acquittees) is substantial. This dif-
ference will surely be reflected in the results of hearings under the two sys-
tems. Indeed, in cases involving insanity acquittees the allocation of the
burden may well be dispositive. Requiring the acquittee to establish that he
does not meet the criteria for commitment may prove to be an impossible
burden before trial courts which, because of understandable political pres-
sures, are not predisposed to order his release from confinement.
The final element of the procedural due process test is an evaluation of the
government's interest in avoiding the additional procedure. Usually this fac-
tor addresses the costs of the requested procedure, such as the financial cost
of providing appointed counsel to indigents. In Jones, the majority focused
on "the Government's strong interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de
novo commitment hearing following every insanity acquittal-a hearing at
which a jury trial may be demanded.., and at which the Government bears
the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence."79 This characteriza-
tion of the governmental interest suggests that such hearings will be numer-
ous and thus burdensome. Yet we know that few defendants are acquitted
78. It could be argued that the Court alluded to the issue of error reduction implicitly by
mentioning the District of Columbia's procedures for post-commitment review. 463 U.S. at
363 n. 11. The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of these provisions. Id. But this
passing reference provides no analysis of whether these procedures leave a substantial risk of
error that other procedures requested by Jones could have reduced.
79. Id. at 366.
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by reason of insanity.8° The Court counts as a major cost the provision of
jury trials, although the availability of juries in civil commitment cases is
generally held to be within the discretion of the states.81 Therefore, a state
that found this a burdensome requirement could constitutionally provide for
commitment proceedings to be heard by judges.8 2 Even more puzzling is the
Court's insistence on counting, as a reason for avoiding the requested alloca-
tion of the burden of proof to the government, the fact that the burden
would then be on the government. It is certainly circular to suggest that a
persuasive reason for avoiding a requested procedure is the fact that it will
otherwise have to be provided.
The Court also observes that the hearing would be burdensome because
"[i]nstead of focusing on the critical question whether the acquittee has re-
covered, the new proceeding likely would have to relitigate much of the
criminal trial."83 The Court's meaning is unclear. First, the "critical ques-
tion" is not whether the acquittee has "recovered," but rather whether the
government can lawfully confine him following his acquittal. Some defend-
ants will not have "recovered" from all indicia of mental disability, but will
no longer be (or never were) dangerous to others. This is particularly true
for mentally retarded defendants.8 4 Also, it is not clear why the Court be-
lieves that "much of the criminal trial" would have to be relitigated. The
criminal offense for which the defendant was acquitted may, or may not, be
necessary as evidence of the acquittee's dangerousness, but demonstrating it
anew will not be more burdensome than adducing evidence to demonstrate
dangerousness in any other civil commitment proceeding.
Whatever the public policy merits of placing the burden of persuasion on
the government in the commitment of insanity acquittees, it is clear that the
Supreme Court's use of the due process balancing test in Jones was far from
even-handed. The awkwardness and seeming illogic of the majority opinion
stem from the fact that the balancing test asks questions that are incongruent
with the policies underlying automatic commitment. The main reason for
avoiding a requirement that the state bear the burden at a commitment hear-
80. See Steadman & Braff, Defendants Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, in MENTALLY
DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 109, 110 (J.
Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983); Steadman, Monahan, Harstone, Davis & Robbins, Men-
tally Disordered Offenders. A National Survey of Patients and Facilities, 6 LAW & HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 31, 36 (1982).
81. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1190, 1291-95 (1974).
82. This problem is even less troublesome than it may appear, since even where juries are
permitted in civil commitment cases under state law, they are seldom requested.
83. 463 U.S. at 366.
84. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 1, at 468.
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ing is not that such a hearing would add little of value to the rights of acquit-
tees. Rather, the incentive for avoiding Addington hearings is that they
might produce "undesirable" results in some cases-cases in which the gov-
ernment could not demonstrate that the acquittee is subject to lawful con-
finement. The concern about this prospect is not that those judgments
would be factually incorrect, but rather that they would be politically unac-
ceptable.8" Presumably, the public demand is that acquittees not be allowed
to "get off," and a system of automatic commitment under which the indi-
vidual never receives an Addington hearing is more likely to satisfy that de-
sire than a system in which the acquittee's current mental condition and
prospective dangerousness are fairly litigated. This result can be accom-
plished within the Court's previously announced test for procedural due pro-
cess cases only by doctrinal brute force.
C. Duration of Special Commitment
The simplest and most emotionally appealing argument advanced by the
defendant in Jones was that he had been held in involuntary confinement as
an acquittee for many years longer than he possibly could have been incar-
cerated as a convict. Counsel for Jones argued that equal protection and due
process were denied when he was not treated as an ordinary mental patient
when the government's right to hold him would have expired had he been
convicted. Whatever the merits of treating insanity acquittees differently for
initial commitment and retention decisions, it was argued, they should be
treated the same as civil patients at the expiration of the maximum author-
ized sentence for the offense with which they were charged. Thus the Court
was asked to hold that the government's ability to confine an acquittee under
special commitment procedures should expire at the end of the maximum
sentence he could have received had he been found guilty.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The majority concluded that
the hypothetical maximum sentence for which an acquittee was tried was
unrelated to the amount of time needed to treat him for his mental disabil-
ity.86 It further suggested that because the sentence was selected by the leg-
85. Another wrinkle in the political aspects of this dispute is the possibility that one of the
reasons courts may go through doctrinal contortions in supporting automatic commitment and
avoiding equation with the Addington rights of other civil commitment patients is that they
believe this to be necessary in order to "save" the insanity defense itself. The Jones majority
opinion hints at this motivation in suggesting that placing the commitment burden on the state
as in Addington might lead the legislature to make the insanity defense itself more difficult.
463 U.S. at 368 n.17. It is not clear whether the Court's speculations about legislative politics
are correct, but they are arguably ultra vires and surely inappropriate in an analysis of the
requirements of the due process clause.
86. "There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length of
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islature for punitive purposes, use of that time period as a limitation on
commitment would constitute impermissible punishment of a person who
had not been convicted and therefore could not be punished.87
The majority's analysis attempts to answer the wrong question."8 The is-
sue is not how long Jones could be lawfully committed, but rather how long
he could be confined under procedures different from those employed for
general commitment patients. The Court is correct in stating that treatment
needs should be a determining factor in ascertaining the appropriate length
of commitment.8 9 But the duration of the applicability of special commit-
ment procedures should be set independently by principles of fairness and
equality. Those principles require that special commitment be limited to the
period of time during which the individual could have been confined had he
been convicted.9"
The statutory scheme approved in Jones puts a prosecutor whose primary
motivation is maximizing the length of confinement and incapacitation of a
defendant in a better position with an acquittal than he or she could achieve
with a conviction, at least in cases in which the possible sentence for the
criminal charge is relatively short.9 The legislative determination of an ap-
propriate sentence sets the length of time that the state believes is just for
purposes of removing a convict from society, and thus constitutes a rough
measure of proportionality between the offense and the appropriate maxi-
mum length of confinement.9 2 It also reflects the legislature's judgment that
no additional period of confinement is necessary to protect the public from
the defendant's dangerousness unless he also meets the criteria for civil com-
time necessary for recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence
therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment." 463 U.S. at 369.
87. Id. at 368-69.
88. See Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, which comes much closer to getting the
question right. Id. at 371. See also the dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens. Id. at 387.
89. An individual's need for treatment or habilitation is not the sole criterion for commit-
ment; prospective dangerousness must also be demonstrated. "His confinement rests on his
continuing illness and dangerousness." Id. at 369.
90. Cf Margulies, supra note 11, at 825-27 (suggesting that another means of reducing the
harshness of indefinite commitment would be to end all special commitments at an arbitrary
time limit, such as five years).
91. It may be noteworthy on this point that the prosecution did not contest Mr. Jones'
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. See supra note 37. See generally Rogers, Bloom &
Manson, Insanity Defenses: Contested or Conceded, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 885 (1984). The
possibility of prolonged confinement in excess of the maximum sentence obviously will reduce
the desirability of plea bargaining for defendants in insanity defense cases.
92. Individualization in the sentencing process allows the judge to decide that a particular
convicted defendant should be confined for a shorter period of time (or not at all, as in sen-
tence of probation), but does not permit an individual sentence longer than the maximum
provided by the legislature.
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mitment. The expiration of that maximum period is the end of the state's
declared interest in incapacitation and confinement of people who have com-
mitted that particular offense.
Special commitment systems for insanity acquittees are a recognition that
the state has an interest in the confinement of acquittees that is different
from its interest in the confinement of other mental patients, and that special
interest must be related to the offense committed by the individual acquittee.
The state interest occasioned by attempted petit larceny is finite and mea-
sured by the maximum sentence;93 it does not increase when the offender
proves to be mentally disabled. Any greater interest in confining the dis-
abled offender must arise from his disability rather than his offense. Confin-
ing an acquittee for a longer period than the maximum sentence for his
crime can only be justified by his continuing treatment or habilitation needs,
and at that point, the fact of his offense becomes irrelevant.94 Therefore,
there is no justification for treating him differently than general commitment
patients who have a continuing treatment or habilitation need. Thus general
commitment procedures should be the only means of extending such a
commitment.
The Jones majority responds that using the sentence as a measure of the
permissible length of commitment would constitute punishment of those
who may not be punished.95 But the petitioner's suggested use of the hypo-
thetical maximum sentence does not involve an attempt to allow states to
punish acquittees, but rather an attempt to circumscribe the otherwise limit-
less power of the government to treat acquittees differently from other com-
mitted patients. Giving Mr. Jones an Addington hearing at the end of one
year of commitment surely cannot be seen as more punitive than denying
him such a hearing forever.
93. The Jones majority acknowledges this fact. "A particular sentence of incarceration is
chosen to reflect society's view of the proper response to commission of a particular criminal
offense, based on a variety of considerations such as retribution, deterrence, and rehabilita-
tion." 463 U.S. at 368-69.
94. Similarly, in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), a unanimous Court declared
that the Constitution requires that mentally ill prisoners be committed by general commitment
procedures if their continued confinement is sought at the expiration of their sentence. The
Jones majority does not address the rationale behind Baxstrom, but merely observes that it did
not involve an insanity acquittee. 463 U.S. at 369 n. 19; cf id. at 375-76 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Surely a fuller explanation of why the majority did not deem Baxstrom controlling on
this point would have been appropriate.
95. 463 U.S. at 369.
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D. Conclusion
The Jones decision establishes a federal96 constitutional floor for proce-
dures for the civil commitment of acquittees in jurisdictions where the de-
fendant bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of insanity at criminal
trials. It does not address the constitutionality of similar procedures where
the state bears the burden of proving sanity, and it does not preclude any
jurisdiction from voluntarily adopting more substantial procedural protec-
tions. Although the Court upheld the constitutionality of the policy judg-
ments made by Congress in the District of Columbia statute, its decision
does not endorse the wisdom of those judgments. State legislatures, given
the political pressures raised by the insanity defense, may be tempted to
adopt similar provisions, but they need not do so and, indeed, there are sub-
stantial reasons to take a different approach. The Jones decision grants a
substantial latitude to the states in setting commitment procedures, but each
state must address the public policy issues surrounding the appropriateness
of treating acquittees differently from other patients. Reviewing the various
available models for systems of special commitment of acquittees may pro-
vide some guidance to states considering how to respond to the dilemmas
presented by the insanity defense.
III. THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION'S POSITION
In the wake of the public reaction to the Hinckley verdict, the American
Psychiatric Association (APA) issued an official position statement on the
insanity defense.97 The statement traced the history of the defense, dis-
cussed the reaction to the Hinckley verdict, and took positions opposing the
abolition of the insanity defense, 98 expressing "extreme" skepticism about
the advisability of enacting "guilty but mentally ill" statutes,99 supporting
abandonment of the volitional prong of the insanity defense," expressing
agnosticism about the allocation of the burden of persuasion on the issue of
insanity at criminal trials,1"' and declining to oppose limitations on psychi-
atric testimony on the "ultimate issue" of insanity."0 2 In addition, it pro-
96. State constitutions may be interpreted to offer greater procedural protections than
those the Supreme Court has recognized in Jones. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977); Meisel, The Rights of
the Mentally Ill Under State Constitutions, 43 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (3) 7 (1982).
97. APA Statement, supra note 5, at 1.
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 14.
100. Id. at 15-16.
101. Id. at 17-18.
102. Id. at 18-20.
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posed changes in the laws governing disposition of individuals acquitted by
reason of insanity. m
By way of preface, the APA report stated that "over the last decade, as a
consequence of some civil libertarian-type court rulings that insanity acquit-
tees may not be subjected to procedures for confinement that are more re-
strictive than those used for civil patients who have not committed criminal
acts, the insanity defense became a more attractive alternative for defendants
to plead.""4 A result, the statement concluded, "has been the rapid release
from hospitals for a segment of insanity acquittees in some states," which, in
turn, "has alarmed both the public and the psychiatric profession."'105 The
APA then expressed concern that this reaction may imperil the continued
availability of the insanity defense: "The public's perception that a success-
ful plea of insanity is a good way to 'beat a rap' contributes to a belief that
the criminal insanity defense is not only fundamentally unfair ('for after all,
he did do it') but also that insanity is a dangerous doctrine."10 6
The APA then proposed a system of special commitment for acquittees.
This system would be more modest in scope than that subsequently upheld
by the Supreme Court in Jones, because it would apply only to defendants
"charged with violent crime."' 7 It is inappropriate to equate these defend-
ants with ordinary civil commitment patients, according to the APA, be-
cause the latter are seldom actually violent, while the acquittees have already
committed acts of violence. This leads to the conclusion that for these
acquittees,
[t]heir future dangerousness need not be inferred; it may be as-
sumed, at least for a reasonable period of time. The American Psy-
chiatric Association is therefore quite skeptical about procedures
now implemented in many states requiring periodic decisionmak-
ing by mental health professionals (or by others) concerning a re-
103. It should be noted that the APA's position is a brief description of its view of pro-
posed statutory approaches; unlike the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards, discussed infra notes 172-208 and accompanying text, it does not purport to
be detailed analysis for acquittees that might lead legislators to tighten up each of the policy
issues involved in enacting such statutes. The issuance of the APA Statement followed the
Hinckley acquittal but preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Jones. While the APA did
not have the benefit of the Court's holdings on the constitutional issues involved in the com-
mitment of acquittees, none of the Statement's proposals are in direct conflict with the holding
in Jones.
104. APA Statement, supra note 5, at 11.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 12. This resembles the Jones majority's expressed concern that requiring an
Addington hearing for acquittees might lead legislators to tighten up the availability of the
defense itself. See supra note 85.
107. APA Statement, supra note 5, at 20. Cf supra text accompanying note 62.
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quirement that insanity acquittees who have committed previous
violent offenses be repetitively adjudicated as "dangerous," there-
upon provoking their release once future dangerousness cannot be
clearly demonstrated in accord with the standard of proof
required. '
The APA also proposed that there be a "presumption" that final discharge
of acquittees be preceded by a long period of conditional release under
clinical supervision, and that adequate resources,_ be provided for this
purpose.109
The statement opposed the continued confinement in mental health facili-
ties of acquittees who are no longer amenable to treatment:
When there exists no realistic therapeutic justification for confine-
ment, the psychiatric facility becomes a prison. The American
Psychiatric Association believes this hypocrisy must be confronted
and remedied. One appropriate alternative is to transfer the locus
of responsibility and confinement for such acquittees to a nontreat-
ment facility that can provide the necessary security." 0
Finally, the APA stated that decisions to release acquittees from confine-
ment "should not be made solely by psychiatrists or solely on the basis of
psychiatric testimony about the patient's mental condition or predictions of
future dangerousness." ''  The statement commended the Oregon model of
a multidisciplinary board for making both commitment and release decisions
for violent acquittees, 12 and stated that such a board should have the au-
thority to order an acquittee's reconfinement. 113
A. Assumption of Future Dangerousness
The APA proposal sensibly suggested that special commitment proce-
dures are warranted for violent acquittees because of the dissimilarity be-
tween the problems they pose and those presented by ordinary civil mental
patients." 4 Less sensible, however, is the APA's suggestion, without cita-
tion to empirical research, that the acquittees' "future dangerousness need
not be inferred; it may be assumed, at least for a reasonable period of
108. APA Statement, supra note 5, at 21.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 22.
111. Id.
112. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.327-161.336 (Repl. 1985). For a discussion of the Oregon
system, see infra text accompanying notes 282-94.
113. APA Statement, supra note 5, at 23.
114. Of course, there are some civil patients who are demonstrably dangerous to others,
but they are the minority among civil commitment patients.
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time.,"115 To the extent that this sentence purports to describe the factual
dangerousness of insanity acquittees, the scientific literature does not sup-
port it. While existing data on recidivism (including both rehospitalization
and subsequent criminal behavior) are imperfect, the studies that have been
published in the professional literature offer no support for the conclusion
that an accurate prediction of subsequent violence can be made from the
mere fact of an acquittal.
1 16
As an empirical assertion, the APA's statement that future dangerousness
can be "assumed" is thus unsupported, and indeed is contradicted by the
existing studies. It simply is not true that all (or even most) acquittees will
engage in dangerous conduct in the future. The statement must therefore be
read as a political judgment that the (much lower) likelihood of future vio-
lence is sufficient, as a matter of policy, to warrant their confinement without
inquiry into their individual propensities. Such a policy judgment, while
surely permissible (and indeed consistent with that of the Congress in the
District of Columbia statute upheld by the Supreme Court in Jones), is not a
scientific conclusion and rests on no special expertise possessed by the psy-
chiatric profession. This judgment about the desirability of automatic com-
mitment of acquittees who were charged with violent crimes masks certain
implicit assumptions about the relative risks and costs of erroneous commit-
ment of this class of patients. It is thus subject to the same criticism as the
Supreme Court's opinion in Jones. Both fail to articulate clearly their under-
lying assumptions, and upon examination these assumptions seem inappro-
priate. If, in fact, acquittal by reason of insanity is not an accurate predictor
of future dangerousness, this proposal displays a willingness to tolerate a
high rate of erroneous commitments with the result of substantial individual
and social costs. Although the prevention of dangerous acts is a compelling
115. The APA does not further explain what it considers "a reasonable period of time." In
approving the model of Oregon's Psychiatric Security Review Board, it notes that the author-
ity of that board is limited to the duration of the sentence an acquittee could have received if
convicted. The APA Statement does not appear to disapprove of this limitation, but it is not
clear whether it believes that future dangerousness can be "assumed" for such a long period,
given the fact that sentences for crimes of violence tend to be long. It should be noted that
while the APA asserts that future dangerousness can be "assumed," the Oregon statute re-
quires that the state demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, the acquittee's current
mental disability and prospective dangerousness to others. OR. REV. STAT. § 262.328 (Repl.
1985).
116. See Steadman & Braff, Defendants Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity, in MENTALLY
DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 109, 118-19
(1983), and studies cited therein. (Using different definitions-including misdemeanors and
property crimes in some instances-and different populations from a variety of jurisdictions,
the recidivism and rehospitalization rates ranged from 20% to 37%. Steadman and Braff
suggest that this is probably higher than for general commitment mental patients but lower
than the rate for ex-convicts.)
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social need, absent empirical support for the assumption of future danger-
ousness from the fact of acquittal, a civil commitment finding regarding fu-
ture dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence would meet this need
consistent with our constitutional commitment to individual liberty.117
The APA's approval of automatic commitment for insanity acquittees is
even more distressing in view of its resistance to providing periodic review
for specially committed acquittees. For civil patients generally, the APA has
endorsed the process of periodic review, with the state bearing the burden of
persuasion by clear and convincing evidence at each interval."' Its opposi-
tion to the same protection against continued erroneous confinement for ac-
quittees presumably results from a greater concern about the prospect of
"premature" release of acquittees whose dangerousness can no longer be
demonstrated but is nonetheless real. This concern is, of course, legitimate,
but the APA's proposal sweeps too broadly in denying acquittees access to
periodic review. It could easily result in life "sentences" for some acquittees
whose potential for dangerous conduct waned long ago.' 19 There exist less
draconian measures to minimize the likelihood of releasing acquittees who
117. Somewhat surprisingly, the APA proposal does not address the issue of whether con-
tinuing mental disability can be "assumed" from the verdict of acquittal, or whether it needs to
be litigated in a commitment hearing (and subsequently on periodic review), and who should
bear the burden of persuasion on this issue. By its silence, the APA avoids endorsing the old
legal fiction that a mental state is invariably presumed to continue indefinitely, a presumption
that is difficult to square with a modern clinical understanding of mental disability. It would
not be inconsistent with the APA position (although arguably awkward in implementation) to
require the state to demonstrate a current condition of mental illness or mental retardation but
not continuing dangerousness. However, there is also a suggestion in the Statement that ac-
quittees can be continued in confinement even when they no longer require treatment, and this
may indicate a view that subsequent commitment need not be supported by demonstration of
current mental disability at all. If this is the proper interpretation of the APA's position, it
raises serious constitutional issues. See infra notes 201-04.
118. American Psychiatric Association, Guidelines for Legislation on the Psychiatric Hospi-
talization of Adults, in ISSUES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 27, 47 (1984).
119. The public's greatest concern, understandably, is with defendants acquitted of homi-
cide. But since homicide is most frequently a crime committed against family members or
close acquaintances, its recidivism rate is quite low. See E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY,
CRIMINOLOGY 513, 650 (10th ed. 1978); N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITI-
CIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 56-57 (1970). Thus prospective dangerousness may not be
completely congruent with the nature of the individual's offense.
Consider, for example, the hypothetical case of an infanticidal mother who kills her baby as
a result of temporary postpartum psychosis, and who is acquitted by reason of insanity. In the
absence of other pathology, her prospective dangerousness must surely be minimal. Yet the
APA proposal would "assume" that dangerousness, commit her automatically, and deny her
periodic review at which the state would be required to demonstrate the likelihood of future
violent conduct. Admittedly, she would be a logical candidate for conditional release under
the APA scheme, and she might be able to bear the burden of persuasion regarding
nondangerousness in proceedings that might be available (although the APA does not discuss
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remain dangerous.120
B. Release Procedures
Even more problematic are some of the APA's proposals regarding release
procedures themselves. The statement declares that the decision to release
an acquittee from confinement should not be a purely clinical judgment left
to the sole discretion of mental health professionals. 121 This is a reasonable
position, and it acknowledges that the decision to release an acquittee has
components beyond the merely clinical. It also provides a check against in-
dividual clinical misjudgment and thus errs, if at all, on the side of caution in
individual cases. It appropriately reflects public concern over the ill-advised
release of violent acquittees.
But the statement also opposed the use of mental health facilities to con-
fine acquittees who are not treatable. This, too, reflects a reasonable clinical
and public policy concern that treatment facilities should not be transformed
into prisons or warehouses by the requirement that they confine individuals
whom they cannot treat.1 22 However, the APA went further and suggested
that acquittees who are not amenable to treatment can be transferred "to a
nontreatment facility that can provide the necessary security.' ' 123 The only
existing facilities that match this description are jails and prisons, and it is
difficult to imagine the invention of new facilities to meet this purpose that
would be substantially different from jails or prisons, however they might be
labeled.
them). But it remains troubling that this proposal would automatically "assume" her present
and continuing mental illness and dangerousness in the face of its clinical implausibility.
A different-and provocative-approach to public concern about the insanity defense is
taken by Professor David Wexler, who argues that the defense should be unavailable to de-
fendants who commit serious crimes against victims to whom they are not related. Wexler, An
Offense-Victim Approach to Insanity Defense Reform, 26 ARiz. L. REV. 17 (1984). See also
Hall, The Insanity Defense. Thumbs Down to Wexler's "Offense- Victim" Limitation, 27 ARIZ.
L. REV. 329 (1985); Wexler, The "Offense- Victim" Insanity Limitation: A Rejoinder, 27 ARIZ.
L. REV. 335 (1985).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 172-208.
121. The APA expresses admiration for Oregon's decision to create a Psychiatric Security
Review Board for these purposes. See supra note 112. The same goals can be accomplished
through a system which requires judicial approval of release decisions. See infra notes 205-07.
122. Some general commitment statutes take the same position. See, e.g., N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 43-1-12(G) (Repl. 1984) ("No mental health treatment facility is required to detain,
treat or provide services to a client when the client does not require such detention, treatment
or services.").
123. Indeed, the APA appears to go even further by suggesting that this class would also
include those who cannot be treated because of "the lack of resources." APA Statement, supra
note 5, at 22. It is inconceivable that the state should be allowed to incarcerate acquitted
persons in nontreatment facilities because it declines to fund their treatment.
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This is a most disturbing suggestion because it envisions the continuing
confinement of an acquittee who is no longer mentally ill or whose mental
illness will not be receiving treatment. Such confinement bears no resem-
blance to lawful commitment of any kind and is either post-acquittal preven-
tive detention or punishment under another label. 124 In its decision in Jones,
which was subsequent to the issuance of the APA statement, the Supreme
Court made clear that it was impermissible to punish acquittees. The APA
statement, which expresses extreme skepticism about the proposed "guilty
but mentally ill" (GBMI) verdict,' 25 has reinvented the GBMI dispositional
system and imposed it upon nondisabled or untreatable acquittees.126 If the
state can confine acquittees without providing them with treatment, it is un-
clear how an acquittal differs from a conviction. Even within the context of
the latitude allowed to states by the Jones decision, this proposal raises seri-
ous constitutional concerns.1
27
There are other ways to address the "hypocrisy" of the hospitalization of
the nontreatable acquittee without running afoul of the principle that pun-
ishment is impermissible for those who have been acquitted. They involve
releasing those acquittees who do not meet commitment criteria. This raises
the specter of releasing a small number of individuals who may continue to
be dangerous. Such a prospect is desired by no one, but the criminal justice
system releases many other dangerous individuals because the Constitution
and sound public policy require rules that prevent their conviction and in-
carceration. Paying that price is no more comfortable, but no less necessary,
where the individual was acquitted by reason of insanity. Our concern with
preventing unnecessary deprivation of liberty mandates that we assume these
risks.
124. The fact that a nontreatable acquittee may still be believed to be dangerous is not
sufficient to warrant his continued confinement in a prison-like setting. Individuals acquitted
for reasons other than insanity, such as the expiration of the statute of limitations or the inabil-
ity of a jury to conclude that they were guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt," may also be
thought to be dangerous, but they cannot be confined on that ground alone. The only thing
that distinguishes insanity acquittees from other acquittees sufficiently to allow subsequent
confinement is the presence of a treatable mental disorder.
125. See supra note 8.
126. Typical GBMI statutes provide that defendants convicted under this verdict may re-
ceive treatment at the discretion of the Department of Corrections, but have no statutory right
to such treatment. See Stelzner & Piatt, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict and Plea in New
Mexico, 13 N.M.L. REV. 99, 115 (1983). A study of the GBMI statute that has been in effect
the longest indicated that GBMI convicts were no more likely to receive treatment than other
prisoners. Project, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical
Study, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 77, 104-05 (1982). For a discussion of the habilitation of men-
tally retarded prisoners under GBMI statutes, see Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 1, at 442-44.
127. See Solvenko, Disposition of the Insanity Acquittee, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 97, 107-08
(1983).
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C. Conclusion
The APA statement represents a timely call for special commitment pro-
cedures for insanity acquittees, but exceeds the bounds of prudent public
policy in its call for automatic commitment without individual determina-
tions of committability or periodic review and infringes upon constitutional
liberties in its proposal for incarceration of those acquittees who cannot be
treated.
IV. THE INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM ACT OF 1984
Congress recently responded to public concern about the insanity defense
by enacting the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 as a part of the Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. 128 The bills that formed the ultimate
legislation were introduced in the wake of the Hinckley acquittal,12 9 and
focused on criminal trials in which the defense of insanity would be raised
and on the disposition of the individuals acquitted, as well as other issues
involving criminal defendants and prisoners who are mentally disabled.
A principal feature of the Act is to change the formulation of the insanity
defense from the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code test 3° to a
slight modification of the Mc'Naghten test (thus abandoning the volitional
prong of the defense),' and to reverse the burden of proof by requiring the
defendant who asserts the defense to prove his insanity by clear and convinc-
128. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). The statute passed the Senate on February
2, 1984, but was not reported to the House Floor by the Judiciary Committee. In the closing
days of the 98th Congress, the Senate bill was attached to the Continuing Appropriations Act
on the House floor and passed.
129. See L. CAPLAN, supra note 11.
130. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985). There was no previous federal statute on the
form of the insanity defense, but the courts of appeals had each individually adopted the ALl
test. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969-73 (D.C. Cir. 1972). But see United
States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1984) (abandoning the ALI test for a formulation
similar to that adopted by Congress later that year). These court decisions are, of course,
superseded by the new statute.
131. The new formulation is similar to that recommended by the American Bar Associa-
tion and the American Psychiatric Association. Cf APA Statement, supra note 5, at 17; ABA
Standards, supra note 1, at 7-6.1. The principal difference is that Congress, in adopting an
amendment in the Judiciary Committee by Senator Specter, added the modifier "severe" to the
term "mental disease or defect." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 422, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3182, 3559 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 225]. The impact
of this amendment, particularly for defendants who are mentally retarded, is not clear. See
generally Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 1, at 437 n. 123. The new statute's criteria for special
commitment of acquittees require merely that the acquittee be dangerous "due to a present
mental disease or defect," which raises the possibility of committing an individual whose cur-
rent disability has improved to the point that it is not "severe" enough to meet the test for
insanity but is nevertheless sufficient to justify commitment.
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ing evidence.'3 2 In addition, the statute revises procedures for defendants
believed to be incompetent to stand trial,"' establishes procedures for evalu-
ation of defendants who assert the insanity defense,134 provides for a special
verdict form when the defendant is acquitted "only by reason of in-
sanity,"' 135 and establishes procedures for committing convicts at sentenc-
ing 136 and as transfers from prison."' It provides for commitment of
permanently incompetent defendants and for prisoners who remain mentally
ill at the end of their sentences. ' s It also amends the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence to preclude expert testimony on the ultimate issue of responsibility in
insanity defense trials. 1
39
In the course of these various changes in federal law regarding mentally
disabled criminal defendants, Congress enacted a system of special commit-
ment for federal defendants found not guilty "only by reason of insanity."
Previously, federal courts had no dispositional powers regarding insanity ac-
quittees and relied on persuading state officials to seek civil commitment
under state law of these individuals following acquittal. "4 According to the
Senate Report accompanying the bill, "[flrequently such efforts are unsuc-
cessful; not uncommonly this is due to lack of sufficient contacts between the
acquitted defendant and a particular State for the latter to be willing to un-
dertake care and treatment responsibility for him."' 14 1 In addition, very few
federal crimes involve violence, and very few federal defendants successfully
assert the insanity defense. Therefore, it had been suggested that Congress
simply permit federal judges to hold acquittees for a period long enough to
accomplish an evaluation of their current mental condition and to invoke
state commitment procedures, rather than create an elaborate set of commit-
132. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1837 (to
be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 20) [hereinafter citations will refer to the codification citation only].
133. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (Supp. 1984).
134. Id. § 4242.
135. Id. Previously, "guilty" and "not guilty" were the only verdicts available under the
federal system, with insanity acquittees subsumed within the latter group without official
designation by the trier of fact of the reason for acquittal. See infra note 140.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
137. Id. § 4245.
138. Id. § 4246.
139. Id. § 406 (amending rule 704).
140. See United States v. Gay, 522 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Alvarez, 519
F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975). This omission had been the subject of sporadic criticism. See, e.g.,
United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 415-18 (5th Cir. 1974); Dession, The Mentally Ill
Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Administration, 53 YALE L.J. 684, 696 (1944); Tydings,
A Federal Verdict of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity and a Subsequent Commitment Proce-
dure, 27 MD. L. REV. 131, 133 (1967).
141. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 131, at 239. See Tydings, supra note 140, at 133.
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ment and release procedures for a handful of federal acquittees. 4 2 Never-
theless, the symbolic and political importance of the disposition of acquittees
was sufficient to persuade Congress to enact federal procedures for
commitment.
Since the insanity defense is rarely employed in federal cases, these proce-
dures have little practical importance in federal law. The procedures may,
however, be considered by states as a model for designing a special commit-
ment system. A brief analysis of the statute, including a comparison to other
available models, is therefore appropriate.
The statute provides for automatic commitment of all insanity acquit-
tees.' 43 Each acquittee is to be examined, and a report prepared on his cur-
rent mental condition.' A commitment hearing is to be held within forty
days of the verdict of acquittal.145 At the hearing, all acquittees must bear
the burden of persuading the court that their "release would not create a
substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage of prop-
erty of another due to a present mental disease or defect," with acquittees in
one category of crimes bearing the burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence, and all other acquittees by a preponderance of the evidence.' 46 If
an acquittee fails to carry his burden, he is to be committed to the custody of
the Attorney General, who is then charged with the responsibility for trying
to persuade the state to confine and treat the acquittee. 14 7 If the state refuses
142. Commentary to ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.3; Limiting the Insanity Defense:
Hearings on S. 818 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 387 (1982) (supplement to testimony of Prof. James W. Ellis).
143. "If a person is found not guilty only by reason of insanity at the time of the offense
charged, he shall be committed to a suitable facility until such time as he is eligible for release
... 18 U.S.C. § 4243(a) (Supp. 11 1984). There is some confusion about whether every
acquittee must be confined; the Senate report states that "[o]f course, if the court believes that
the examination can be conducted on an outpatient basis, it need not order commitment for
the examination." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 131, at 242.
144. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
145. Id. § 4243(c). This time period can apparently be extended for an additional 30 days
upon application by the director of the evaluating facility if more time is needed to accomplish
the evaluation. Id. § 4247(b).
146. Id. § 4243(d). This section provides for a heavier burden of persuasion for individuals
acquitted of offenses "involving bodily injury to, or serious damage to the property of, another
person, or involving a substantial risk of such injury or damage." The Senate Report explains
that "[tihe Committee intends that crimes such as burglary or unarmed robbery with their
likelihood to provoke violence and bodily injury be included in the 'substantial risk' category."
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 131, at 242 n.78.
147. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(e) (Supp. 11 1984). There is no explicit provision for the federal
government to pay for state-provided treatment. That such reimbursement was not antici-
pated is supported by the opinion of the Congressional Budget Office that the statute on the
insanity defense is not expected to have "any significant budgetary effect." S. REP. No. 225,
supra note 131, at 419.
[Vol. 35:961
Consequences of the Insanity Defense
to accept this responsibility, the Attorney General is directed to confine the
acquittee in a "suitable facility."
The acquittee may be released upon his own petition 48 or petition by the
director of the facility. 1 49 In either case, the acquittee will be released only if
the court is persuaded that he no longer meets the commitment criteria. The
acquittee (or the director) bears the same burden of persuasion on the release
issue as in the original hearing. "' Conditional release is permitted, but must
be ordered by the court under the same criteria and burdens as discharge,
and any modifications of the "regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psycholog-
ical care or treatment" must be approved in the same fashion. 5" There is no
provision for expiration of the special commitment procedures at the termi-
nation of the maximum sentence an acquittee could have received if con-
victed, or at any other time.11
2
The basic structure of the federal scheme is not novel; it incorporates au-
tomatic commitment for all acquittees, places the burden of persuasion on
them in seeking their release, and denies them an Addington hearing' 5 3 at
any time throughout the duration of the sentence they could have received if
convicted, or at any time thereafter. The Senate committee report offers no
justification for any of these provisions, but instead merely cites the Jones
opinion for the proposition that they are constitutional.'54 Proposed legisla-
tion which was introduced before the Jones decision, the predecessor to the
bill Congress ultimately enacted, provided that the government would have
the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence in post-acquittal
commitment hearings.' 55 Thus, these provisions of the new federal statute
148. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) (Supp. 11 1984). Such a petition is not permitted for 180 days
following any order that the acquittee should be committed or continued in commitment. Id.
However, access to writs of habeas corpus, which may be used to challenge continued unneces-
sary commitment, is not impaired. Id. § 4247(g).
149. Id. § 4243(f). The director is also required to submit to the court annual reports on
each acquittee's current mental condition. Id. § 4247(e).
150. Id. § 4243(f).
151. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 86-95.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 67-85.
154. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 131, at 425.
155. S. 2572, 97th Cong., 2d Sess, § 701, 128 CONG. REC. 6197, 6220 (1982). The bill was
introduced by Senator Strom Thurmond as the "Violent Crime and Drug Enforcement Im-
provements Act of 1982." Most of its provisions regarding mentally disabled criminal defend-
ants are identical to those ultimately passed by the Congress. Its less restrictive provisions for
commitment of acquittees were described as "noncontroversial modernized procedural provi-
sions" by the sponsors. 128 CONG. REC. at 6226. The bill also provided that the burden of
persuasion on the issue of release at periodic review was on the proponent of release (e.g., the
director of the facility) by a preponderance of the evidence.
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are merely a political reaction to the Hinckley verdict and Congress made
commitment as restrictive as the Jones decision appeared to allow.
A. Criteria for Commitment: Danger to Property
There are several features of the Act, however, that go beyond the system
approved in Jones that are particularly troubling. 15 6 One is the inclusion of
the risk of "serious" damage to property in the criteria for commitment.
Damage to property has been held to be an insufficient justification for gen-
eral civil commitment because the individual's interest in liberty outweighs
the importance of the damage he might do to property.157 The Senate Re-
port attempted to justify the inclusion of danger to property among the crite-
ria for special commitment of acquittees by stating that "danger to the
public from a person who is insane need not be limited to the risk of physical
injury to another person." ' 8 The issue, of course, is not whether there is a
danger, but whether the danger is of sufficient magnitude and likelihood to
justify a deprivation of liberty.159 The scope of the limitation that property
damage be "serious" is not clear,'16 but a predicted propensity to commit
156. An aspect of the legislation that is constitutionally permissible under Jones, but which
raises serious policy concerns, is the use of special commitment for acquittees whose offenses
did not involve actual or threatened violence. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
Although this is constitutional, both the American Psychiatric Association and the American
Bar Association favor limiting special commitment to those who pose an extraordinary danger
to the public as evidenced by the nature of their offense. APA Statement, supra note 5, at 23;
ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.3. The fact that most federal crimes do not remotely
involve violence makes the extension of special commitment particularly questionable.
157. For a case involving general commitment patients, see Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173
(9th Cir. 1980) (which held that Hawaii's commitment statute was unconstitutional based on
its provision for commitment because of dangerousness to property); see also Diamond, The
Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 449-50 (1974); ABA Mental
Commission on the Mentally Disabled, Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals
for Change, Civil Commitment, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 73, 86 (1977). Most modern
civil commitment statutes limit the criteria for commitment to dangerousness to self or others.
Van Duizend, McGraw & Keilitz, An Overview of State Involuntary Civil Commitment Stat-
utes, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 334 (1984). See also American Psychi-
atric Association, Guidelines for Legislation on the Psychiatric Hospitalization of Adults (1982),
in ISSUES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 27, 40 (1984).
158. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 131, at 424 n.77. The Report cites as authority the Jones
case, presumably referring to the passage stating that "[t]his Court never has held that 'vio-
lence,' however that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for constitutional commitment,"
and observing that violence may result from the attempt of a thief to escape capture. 463 U.S.
at 365 n. 14. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. This provision was included in the bill
that preceded the Court's opinion in Jones. See supra note 155.
159. The sufficiency of the state's justification is both an issue of public policy and a consti-
tutional requirement under the substantive component of the due process clause.
160. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Suzuki did not need to reach the issue of whether some
forms of damage to property might be of sufficient magnitude to warrant commitment, since
the statute in question made any damage to property a ground for commitment. 617 F.2d at
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property offenses that do not involve danger to others1 61 constitutes an unac-
ceptably weak justification for depriving an acquitted individual of liberty. 162
B. Burden of Persuasion
Similarly problematic is the Act's standard of proof on the issue of release
from confinement. The statute requires "ordinary" acquittees to prove their
nondangerousness by a preponderance of the evidence, but requires those
acquitted of "violent" crimes to demonstrate their noncommittability by
clear and convincing evidence.' 63 The Senate Report argued that this provi-
sion is permissible' 64 by noting that the Constitution permits allocating the
burden of persuasion on the issue of criminal insanity to the defendant at a
level higher than preponderance of the evidence. 165 The report concluded
that setting a higher standard for proving insanity at trial "in turn would
justify requiring [the acquittee] at the commitment hearing to prove his pres-
ent sanity or lack of dangerousness by such a higher standard."'1
66
This conclusion is questionable both as a matter of logic and of constitu-
tional doctrine. The fact that a jurisdiction may require that an affirmative
defense to a criminal charge be proven by a standard higher than preponder-
ance of the evidence is irrelevant to the issue of the appropriate standard of
proof for release from commitment. The former question involves an asser-
176. See also In re Herman, 30 Wash. App. 321, 634 P.2d 310 (1981) (involving the likelihood
that an acquittee would damage a particular statue in a cemetery).
161. E.g., arson, which clearly could fall within the definition of dangerousness to others.
162. A commendable feature of the Act is the omission of dangerousness to self as a crite-
rion for special commitment of acquittees. While this is a standard component of general
commitment statutes, see supra note 32, there is nothing inherent in an acquittal by reason of
insanity that warrants the use of special commitment procedures in such cases. Acquittees
who constitute a danger to themselves are more appropriately confined under general commit-
ment procedures. See ABA Standards, supra note 1, at Commentary to Standard 7-7.4.
163. See supra note 146. Section 4247(g) provides that nothing in § 4243 "precludes a
person ... from establishing by writ of habeas corpus the illegality of his detention." Tradi-
tionally the burden of persuasion in habeas corpus cases is on the petitioner by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941). It is not clear whether
acquittees in the so-called "violent" crime category will be required to meet a higher standard
of proof in habeas corpus proceedings.
164. The Report makes no argument for the desirability of this provision, but rather
merely contends that it is not unconstitutional. There is no assertion that the government
needs more liberal rules for keeping this category of acquittees in confinement after they can
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they no longer meet the commitment
criteria. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 131.
165. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
166. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 131, at 243. The Report concluded that "[s]ince this bill
requires the defendant to prove his insanity as a defense to the criminal charge by clear and
convincing evidence, it is clearly constitutional to require those defendants acquitted of violent
crimes to prove that they are no longer dangerous or insane by a similar standard." Id.
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tion of a form of excuse for criminal misconduct while the latter is an in-
quiry about whether an acquitted person may be deprived of liberty. The
fact that a jurisdiction imposes a burden heavier than preponderance on the
issue of criminal insanity merely means that in some cases 167 the fact finder
is required to reach a higher level of certainty about the defendant's mental
condition at the time of the offense and its relevance to the offense commit-
ted. This somewhat heightened degree of assurance about earlier events does
not affect the issue of whether the acquittee is mentally disabled at the time
of acquittal or, in periodic review, years later,1 6' nor does it add to our
knowledge about his prospective dangerousness.
169
An increased certitude-beyond a preponderance of the evidence-that
the defendant was insane at the time of the offense does not justify the impo-
sition of more substantial barriers to post-acquittal release. Moreover, such
increased barriers are constitutionally dubious.'7 0 Erection of those barriers
demonstrates congressional intent to assure that even those acquittees who
can show by a preponderance that they are no longer dangerous or mentally
disabled should not be released. The purpose of continuing to confine ac-
quittees who can somehow demonstrate that their release would not imperil
the public can only be punitive, and as the Court declared in Jones, acquit-
tees cannot be punished.171
C. Conclusion
Thus the federal statute offers an inadequate model for states considering
the adoption of special commitment procedures for insanity acquittees. It
unquestioningly adopts every form of restriction made available by the
167. The heightened burden of proof affects only cases at the margin. For example, in a
"preponderance of the evidence" jurisdiction, juries will be persuaded in some cases to a degree
of certainty equivalent to "clear and convincing evidence" and, in a smaller number, "beyond
a reasonable doubt." In the latter groups of cases, the fact that the jurisdiction has adopted a
lower standard is irrelevant to the outcome. Therefore, in both "preponderance" and "clear
and convincing" jurisdictions, there will be cases in which the fact finder is more certain than
is necessary under the relevant standard.
168. It should be recalled that the Act does not place a limitation on use of the special
commitment procedures at the expiration of the sentence an acquittee could have received if
convicted-the burden falls to the acquittee, unless released by the court, for the remainder of
his life.
169. See text accompanying notes 42-66.
170. Nothing in the Jones decision supports the contention that a standard higher than
"preponderance" is constitutionally acceptable on the issue of commitment and periodic re-
view following acquittal. The Court merely speculates that placing the burden on the govern-
ment at commitment might lead legislators to narrow the scope of the insanity defense by
increasing the burden of persuasion on the defendant at the criminal trial. 463 U.S. at 368
n.17. See supra note 85.
171. 463 U.S. at 369.
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flawed opinion in Jones and enacts even more drastic limitations than ap-
proved by Jones on the rights of acquittees to a fair hearing on their need for
commitment. While the Act is understandable as a political reaction to pub-
lic outcries at a particularly unpopular verdict, it strikes the wrong balance
in weighing the public's need for protection against legitimate liberty inter-
ests and thus should not be followed by state legislatures seeking reform in
this area.
V. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS
The American Bar Association recently concluded a three-year project to
devise standards for mental disability cases in the criminal justice system
with the adoption of ninety-six standards in August 1984.172 The project
involved participation by six interdisciplinary task forces whose membership
included lawyers, judges, and mental health and mental retardation profes-
sionals.17 3 The resulting standards are incorporated into the more compre-
hensive body of Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 17 4 which
address a wide variety of criminal law and criminal procedure issues. In
addition to the commitment of acquittees, the new mental health standards
address the roles of mental disability professionals and lawyers in the crimi-
nal justice system, the role of the police in dealing with mentally disabled
people, pretrial evaluations and expert testimony, competence to stand trial
and competence for other situations, the insanity defense (designated "non-
responsibility for crime""15), special dispositional statutes, sentencing, and
mentally disabled prisoners.
The ABA standards provide that each state should adopt procedures for
evaluating the current mental condition of all defendants acquitted by reason
172. See George, The American Bar Association's Mental Health Standards: An Overview,
53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 338 (1985). Each standard is accompanied by explanatory commen-
tary, but only the standards themselves have been adopted as the official position of the ABA.
The Criminal Justice Mental Health Project was begun well before the Hinckley verdict.
Following the acquittal, the project reevaluated its tentative positions on the form of the in-
sanity defense and changed its recommendation from the ALI test to a modified version of
M'Naghten that lacks the volitional prong of the ALI formulation. Following the Jones deci-
sion, the task force on commitment of acquittees convened to reconsider its tentative view that
the state should bear the burden of persuasion and that special commitment should expire with
the maximum possible sentence. The task force reiterated its previous view that these positions
were necessitated by principles of fundamental fairness even if they were not mandated by the
Constitution, and the ABA house of Delegates concurred in that judgment. Id.
173. A law professor served as "Law Reporter" for each task force. The author was Law
Reporter for the task force on Commitment of Nonresponsibility Acquittees.
174. ABA Standards, supra note 1. See Hodson, The American Bar Association Standards
for Criminal Justice: Their Development, Evolution and Future, 59 DEN. L.J. 3 (1981).
175. See supra note 1.
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of insanity, to be completed within thirty days of the verdict of acquittal. 17 6
If the prosecution decides to seek commitment, the acquittee is entitled to a
judicial hearing on whether he is currently committable. Acquittees who
were charged with crimes that did not involve violence 177 can be committed
only under the general commitment laws applicable to proposed patients
outside the criminal justice system.178 Acquittees who were charged with
violent crimes can be confined and treated under a system of special commit-
ment, which the ABA recommends that every state adopt. 179
At the initial special commitment hearing following the evaluation, the
acquittee can be committed if the court finds, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that he is "currently mentally ill or mentally retarded" and "as a
result, poses a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to others."180 The use
of special commitment criteria and procedures cannot extend beyond the
period of the maximum sentence an acquittee could have received if con-
victed; thereafter, the acquittee can continue to be confined only pursuant to
176. ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.1, 7-7.2.
177. ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.3(a) describes this category as "felonies which
did not involve acts causing, threatening, or creating a substantial risk of death or serious
bodily harm." The Commentary notes that the ABA declines to specify which crimes fall
within this category, leaving this task to the individual states. It is clear that the category is
narrower than that drawn by Congress in the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984. See supra
note 146.
178. ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.3(b). It should be noted that the standard only
approves the use of general commitment procedures which "satisfy the requirements of due
process of law." The Commentary notes that while commitment procedures for mentally ill
persons have generally conformed to modern due process case law, the same is not uniformly
true of statutes for the confinement of mentally retarded people. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra
note 1, at 468-69; DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSuES 416-21
(B. Sales, D. Powell, R. Van Duizend eds. 1982). See generally Dybwad & Herr, Unnecessary
Coercion: An End to Involuntary Civil Commitment of Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV.
753 (1979). Although they were designed for acquittees charged with violent felonies, Stan-
dards 7-7.4 (on commitment criteria and burden of persuasion) and 7-7.5 (on procedures to be
followed at the commitment hearing) may serve as an approximation of constitutional minima
necessary in gauging the requirements of due process in general commitment procedures as
well.
179. ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.3(a). The ABA also proposes that this system of
special commitment is appropriate for dangerous individuals found permanently incompetent
to stand trial who have been shown at a hearing to have committed the offense for which they
cannot be "tried." See id. at 7-4.13(b) and accompanying commentary. Discussion of this
proposal is beyond the scope of the present Article.
180. ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.4(b). The court must also find, beyond a reason-
able doubt, that the acquittee committed the criminal act for which he was charged. Id. at 7-
7.4(c). In some jurisdictions this will have been an essential element of the trial court's verdict
of acquittal by reason of insanity, but in others, it may have to be independently demonstrated.
Without a finding that the acquittee actually did the act for which he was charged, there is not
a sufficient basis for employing special (and more restrictive) commitment procedures.
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general commitment procedures.'' The specially committed acquittee can
request a hearing on his continuing need for confinement one year after his
initial commitment and at two-year intervals thereafter.' 8 2 At these acquit-
tee-initiated periodic review hearings, the state must bear the burden of per-
suasion by clear and convincing evidence that the acquittee meets the
commitment criteria.'8 3 The standards also provide for release upon the pe-
tition of the superintendent of the facility8 4 and for a system of court-ap-
proved authorized leave.'
8 5
181. Standard 7-7.7 provides that the committing judge should establish a maximum dura-
tion for special commitment which cannot exceed the length of the sentence, but which may be
shorter. In setting this limit, the court may consider a variety of factors, but "retribution or
punitive factors" cannot be considered. ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.7.
182. The court has authority under Standard 7-7.8(a) to set a shorter interval between
petitions by the acquittee as his mental condition "and other relevant factors" may warrant.
Id. at 7-7.8(a).
183. Id. at 7-7.8(b). Like the federal statute, the ABA provides that the acquittee retains
the right to petition for habeas corpus at any time. Id. at 7-7.8(d). However, the difference
between the burden of persuasion in the two systems gives the writ of habeas corpus different
roles. A defendant committed under the ABA's standards will find the writ less attractive
because, unlike periodic review, the habeas corpus petition must persuade the court of his or
her entitlement to release by a preponderance of the evidence. Under the federal statute, an
acquittee who was charged with a "nondangerous" crime will find habeas corpus identical to
his situation under periodic review, while the acquittee charged with a "violent" offense will
find the burden lower than that which he faces under the statute. See supra note 146.
184. Under ABA Standard 7-7.9, the acquittee is to be released if the superintendent
proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he no longer meets the commitment criteria.
ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.9.
185. The "authorized leave" provisions of Standard 7-7.11 roughly parallel the provisions
for "conditional release" under the federal statute, the Model Penal Code, the Uniform Law
Commissioners' Model Act, and the APA Statement. See 18 U.S.C. § 4243(g) (Supp. 111984);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08(4) (1985); UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL INSANITY
DEFENSE AND POST-TRIAL DISPOSITION ACT § 906, 11 U.L.A. 167 (Supp. 1986) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL ACT]; APA Statement, supra note 5, at 21. All the models agree that outright
release should not be the only option for returning an acquittee to the community. If this were
the only option, decisionmakers (whether judges, administrative boards, or mental disability
professionals) would be extremely reluctant to release an acquittee from commitment because
an error leading to a premature release could imperil the public safety and thus engender
public criticism. The alternative of authorized leave or conditional release permits a more
tentative testing of the acquittee's readiness to return in safety to the community. The ABA's
approach is slightly more restrictive than the federal statute. Under Standard 7-7.11(c), au-
thorized leave may be revoked for any violation of a condition imposed by the court. ABA
Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.11(c). Section 4243(g) of the federal statute requires that the
court determine that noncompliance with "the regimen" indicates prospective dangerousness.
18 U.S.C. § 4243(g) (Supp. 11 1984). The Commissioners' Model Act focuses on the prospec-
tive dangerousness of the acquittee on conditional release rather than his compliance with the
conditions established by the court. MODEL ACT § 906(d), (e).
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A. Comparison to General Commitment
Several features of the ABA model merit discussion. One is the governing
principle basic to its design. In setting the categories of offenses triggering
special commitment, the criteria for commitment, the burden of persuasion,
and procedures for release, the standards begin from the premise that acquit-
tees should be treated differently from ordinary mental patients only where
there is a factual basis for a distinction. Although the Jones opinion grants
extraordinary constitutional latitude in implementing this principle,' 86 the
ABA standards reflect the view that sound public policy requires a persua-
sive showing to warrant differential treatment. The threat posed to the pub-
lic by persons acquitted of violent crimes warrants more rigorous and
deliberate procedures preceding their release and greater care in supervising
their activities in the community. It does not, however, justify less rigorous
procedural protections in determining whether they should be committed or
continue to be confined. The options made permissible by Jones have been
rejected by the ABA as unwise.' 87
Yet the ABA has also rejected treating violent acquittees the same as ordi-
nary mental patients. Although offering the states an option of either special
commitment or general 188 commitment for all acquittees was considered,'89
the final approved standards recommended that all states adopt special com-
mitment procedures.' 90 Despite the existence of a substantial theoretical ar-
gument for equivalent treatment, 19' practical considerations outweigh the
value of treating all committed patients identically. Some general commit-
ment patients will be manifestly dangerous to others, but the number is rela-
tively small and the civil commitment system is designed for a patient
population whose overall level of dangerousness to others is relatively small
186. The majority appears to acknowledge that departures from ordinary procedures must
be supported by a demonstration of empirical differences: "[C]oncerns critical to our decision
in Addington are diminished or absent in the case of insanity acquittees." 463 U.S. at 367.
187. As will be true for many states, the Jones holding does not directly apply to the stan-
dards, since they recommend, under the ABA's favored test for nonresponsibility, that the
burden of persuasion at the criminal trial be placed on the prosecution. See ABA Standards,
supra note 1, at Intro. to Part VII & Standard 7-6.9. But even for those jurisdictions that
require a defendant to demonstrate his insanity at trial, the ABA rejects, as fundamentally
unfair and empirically unwarranted, the shifting of the burden at subsequent special commit-
ment hearings. See ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.4 and accompanying Commentary.
188. The term "general" commitment is used here, as in the ABA Standards, to describe
civil commitment procedures employed by a jurisdiction to commit ordinary civil commitment
patients outside the criminal justice system.
189. See ABA Standards, supra note 1, at Commentary to Standard 7-7.3.
190. ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.3(a).
191. These arguments contend that nothing relevant is learned from the criminal verdict
that is sufficient to distinguish acquittees from general commitment patients regarding com-
mitment procedures. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 16.
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or who only pose a danger to themselves. The typical general commitment
patient more closely resembles a parens patriae patient like Mrs. Lake 9 2
than John W. Hinckley, Jr.
Modem mental health statutes governing general civil commitment are
designed to provide needed institutional treatment, but also to facilitate and
encourage the earliest possible release of the patient to the community. This
reflects a judgment that long-term institutionalization should be avoided be-
cause it is a "massive curtailment of liberty," '19 3 and because it is generally
believed to be both ineffective and counter-therapeutic for most patients.' 94
This goal is accomplished by shortening the duration of commitment or-
ders, 195 requiring exhaustion of less restrictive alternatives before institution-
alization can be mandated,' 96 and giving clinical personnel the authority to
devise and implement transitional programs such as conditional release and
to release patients outright when, in their professional judgment, confine-
ment and mandatory treatment are no longer warranted. 197 These proce-
dures have combined with the ubiquitous prescription of psychotropic
medications and the development of successful community treatment' 9" and
192. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (describing a confused 60-year-
old taken into custody by a police officer who found her wandering aimlessly).
193. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
194. The causes of the demise of the previous consensus that institutionalization was the
treatment of choice for all mental patients has been described by historian David Rothman.
D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 324-75 (1980). The preferability of community care for many men-
tally disabled people was argued by several prestigious commissions in the 1950's, 1960's, and
1970's. See J. ROBITSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 122-27 (1980); 1 PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT
16 (1978). The new consensus supporting community care developed a symbiotic relationship
with the legal doctrine that treatment should be provided in the least restrictive alternative.
See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("A finding of 'mental illness' alone
cannot justify a State's locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in
simple custodial confinement."); Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Il. Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972). See gen-
erally P. LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE (1982).
195. Even the American Psychiatric Association has recommended an initial commitment
of no longer than 30 days, and the longest recommended period before the expiration of subse-
quent commitment orders is 180 days. American Psychiatric Association, Guidelines For Leg-
islation on the Psychiatric Hospitalization of Adults, in ISSUES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 39,
48 (1984).
196. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3(D) (Repl. 1984) (defining "least drastic means
principle"). See generally AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, THE LEAST
RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (H.R. Turnbull ed. 1981).
197. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-12(G) (Repl. 1984): "No mental health treatment
facility is required to detain, treat or provide services to a client when the client does not
require such detention, treatment or services."
198. See Chambers, supra note 194.
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habilitation 199 programs to shorten the average stay in mental hospitals to a
fraction of the typical duration two or three decades ago.200
Only some of these developments have relevance for the appropriate treat-
ment of acquittees. Overall they presuppose that the dangerousness of
mental patients is minimal and can be readily reduced by treatment and ha-
bilitation in settings that lack substantial restrictions on physical liberty.
These assumptions are less likely to be true for a patient who has been found
beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed a violent criminal offense.
The public's perception of the peril posed by insanity acquittees is surely
exaggerated, but it is by no means groundless. A commitment system that
minimizes restrictions and relentlessly promotes early release is ill-designed
for a class of patients who have so clearly demonstrated their dangerousness
to others. As a result, a departure from general commitment procedures is
warranted where they would otherwise fail to assure that release into the
community is the result of careful evaluation of the acquittee's current
mental condition and potential for violent conduct. Thus, the ABA has re-
quired all decisions about release and authorized leave of violent acquittees
to be made by a court. It has also recommended commitment periods some-
what longer than are common under general civil commitment statutes.
There is another persuasive reason for rejecting identical treatment of vio-
lent acquittees and general commitment patients. As noted above, the typi-
cal general commitment patient is a disabled individual who poses little or
no threat to society and whose involuntary confinement and restriction of
199. Community-based programs for mentally retarded people have been particularly suc-
cessful. See B. BAKER, G. SELTZER & M. SELTZER, As CLOSE AS POSSIBLE: COMMUNITY
RESIDENCES FOR RETARDED ADULTS (1977); D. BRADDOCK, OPENING CLOSED DOORS:
THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DISABLED INDIVIDUALS (1977); K. CASEY, J. MCGEE, J.
STARK & F. MENOLASCINO, A COMMUNITY-BASED SYSTEM FOR THE MENTALLY RE-
TARDED: THE ENCOR EXPERIENCE (1985) (describing one major metropolitan area that
serves virtually all its mentally retarded citizens-regardless of level of mental retardation-in
the community); J. CONROY & V. BRADLEY, PENNHURST LONGITUDINAL STUDY: A RE-
PORT OF FIVE YEARS OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (Temple University & Human Services
Research Institute 1985) (finding that all Pennhurst residents-regardless of level of mental
disability-could be served successfully in the community); DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND
COMMUNITY ADJUSTMENT OF MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE (R. Bruininks, C. Meyers, B.
Sigford & K. Lakin eds. 1981); PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION,
CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED (R. Ku-
gel & A. Shearer rev. ed. 1976).
200. As early as 1971, the average stay in a state hospital had been reduced to 41 days, and
86.9% of all patients were released within six months of admission. A. STONE, MENTAL
HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 41 (1976). One study suggests that even after
the trend toward shortened commitments was well underway, the enactment of a more restric-
tive civil commitment statute reduced the number of long-term commitments by half. E.
BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A BILL BECOMES A
LAW 286 (1977).
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liberty should be held to the minimum time period necessary. If a state
chooses to use the same commitment criteria for both this benign group and
violent acquittees, the political concern aroused by fear of the latter will de-
mand commitment and release procedures that are much more restrictive
than they would choose for general patients alone. Selecting a unitary sys-
tem of commitment would thus provide less restrictive treatment for a very
small group at the expense of unnecessary deprivations of liberty for a sub-
stantially larger group. This would be especially hard to justify since the
smaller group (i.e. violent acquittees) has a much weaker claim to our sym-
pathy and tolerance. Therefore, the adoption of a separate system of special
commitment for violent acquittees protects both the public and the rights of
general civil commitment patients.
B. Criteria for Commitment: Treatability
Another noteworthy feature of the ABA standards is the omission from
the criteria for special commitment of a requirement that the acquittee be
shown to be amenable to treatment or habilitation. As discussed above, the
American Psychiatric Association described as "hypocrisy" the practice of
requiring treatment facilities to confine individuals when "there exists no
realistic therapeutic justification for confinement." '' The APA proposed
remedying this "hypocrisy" with the dubious proposal to confine such ac-
quittees in "nontreatment" facilities.2" 2 The Bar Association's standards do
not explicitly address this problem, but by omitting treatability from the cri-
teria for commitment, they implicitly allow the continued confinement of an
acquittee who remains mentally disabled and dangerous but who cannot be
treated effectively.2 °3 This presents a most difficult dilemma. Making
treatability a condition of special commitment could result in the release of
individuals acknowledged to be both mentally disabled and dangerous.
Omitting it requires confinement in some cases where there is no rationale to
distinguish confinement of these individuals from dangerous acquittees who
are not mentally disabled, and thus transforms special commitment into
unadorned preventive detention.2° There is room for disagreement about
201. See supra text accompanying notes 110, 122-27.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 122-27.
203. See ABA Standards, supra note 1, at Commentary to Standard 7-7.4.
204. Such individuals present an equal protection problem because they are confined when
equally dangerous individuals who are not mentally disabled are not (including acquittees who
have recovered from their disability). Typically, the rationale offered for commitment of the
dangerous who are mentally ill, as contrasted to dangerous individuals who are not mentally
ill, is that the former can be treated. That rationale is unavailable when untreatable acquittees
are confined.
Another rationale has occasionally been offered to justify confining dangerous individuals
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whether the approach chosen by the ABA is the best of an unattractive set of
alternatives.
C. Release Procedures and Access to Counsel
Finally, it is noteworthy that the standards require the individual acquit-
tee to request a hearing on periodic review.2"' An earlier draft had proposed
two alternative systems for consideration by the states, one that placed the
burden of initiation on the state, and the other on the acquittee. The final
standards include only the acquittee-initiated review mechanism, because of
concern that a system that required the state to initiate the process theoreti-
cally risked the release of an acquittee only because the official responsible
for filing the petition for recommitment neglected to perform his or her
duty.2 °6
As the Commentary acknowledges, this is a difficult issue since the acquit-
tee may lack the knowledge, understanding, initiative, or means to file the
necessary petition to begin the periodic review process. In an attempt to
mitigate this problem, the standards insist that all acquittees have access to
regularly available legal assistance. 20 7 The possibility exists that an acquit-
tee who has long since been rendered nondangerous will remain sufficiently
disabled (or become sufficiently institutionalized) that he will not be able to
seek periodic review and will, as a result, get lost in the special commitment
system until the expiration of his hypothetical sentence. This prospect was
who are mentally disabled while not confining equally dangerous persons who aren't disabled.
This argument suggests that the point of distinction between these two groups is that the
nondisabled are really less dangerous because they can be deterred from committing violent
acts by fear of the punishment they may face under the criminal law. This theoretical distinc-
tion is a favorite ploy of law professors, but ultimately it is unsatisfactory in its attempt to
rationalize confinement of mentally disabled persons without treatment or habilitation, partic-
ularly in the context of insanity acquittees. It fails because it denies the premise of the argu-
ment: that there are some nondisabled individuals who can be predicted, with some accuracy,
to constitute a danger to society. The equal protection analysis hinges not on whether the
nondisabled are somehow less dangerous than the disabled, but rather whether they are dan-
gerous enough to constitute a threat to the public if left at liberty. The rationale about deter-
rence is even less persuasive when applied to a comparison between insanity acquittees and
other defendants who were acquitted for other reasons (such as the exclusion of illegally seized
evidence). If acquittees in each group committed the act constituting the violent offense, each
has demonstrated equally that it is at least sometimes immune to being deterred by the pros-
pect of punishment. This ploy will not suffice to justify confining the mentally disabled while
leaving similarly dangerous persons at liberty.
205. See ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.8(a). Once the acquittee has petitioned for
the hearing, the burden of persuasion is on the state. Id. at 7-7.8(b). See supra note 183.
206. See ABA Standards, supra note 1, at Commentary to Standard 7-7.8.
207. Another mitigating feature is the opportunity afforded by the ABA Standards for the
Superintendent to petition for the release of an acquittee whom he or she believes not to be
presently committable. See ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.9.
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deemed insufficient to outweigh the risks of a state-initiated system of peri-
odic review, but it is a real enough possibility to require that a state adopting
special commitment make diligent efforts to provide appropriate legal assist-
ance to acquittees.
D. Conclusion
The ABA standards represent an attempt to protect the public from vio-
lent acquittees without denying them fair treatment or resorting to disguised
(and impermissible) punishment of individuals who have been acquitted.2 8
VI. THE UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL ACT
Following the Hinckley verdict, the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws 20 9 took under consideration the issues of the
insanity defense and subsequent commitment. While acknowledging that
this was "not a subject on which uniformity among states is a principal ob-
jective, '2 1° the Conference thought it important to "call attention to the is-
sues" and "provide a means of dealing with those questions."2"' Its
deliberations were attended by representatives of the American Psychiatric
Association, the American Psychological Association, the National Com-
mission on the Insanity Defense 2 12 and the American Bar Association's
Standing Committee on Criminal Justice Standards.21 3 The Model Act was
adopted by the Conference in August of 1984.214
The Model Act adopts a test for criminal responsibility 215 that is identical
to that adopted in the ABA standards.21 6 It places the burden of disproving
208. The degree of success of this attempt is, of course, for others to judge.
209. The National Conference consists of Commissioners from each state, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Each Commissioner is appointed by the jurisdiction's chief exec-
utive for a term of three years. The Commission promulgates model statutes as proposals to
the states, with the principal purpose of "promot[ing] uniformity in state laws on all subjects
where uniformity is deemed desirable and practicable." Explanation, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform Laws, 14 U.L.A. iv (1980).
210. MODEL ACT, supra note 185, at Prefatory Note.
211. Id.
212. See infra notes 295-302.
213. MODEL ACT Prefatory Note.
214. Id. Thus, the Commissioners had access to all the other models discussed in this
Article.
215. The Model Act does not use the term "insanity" in its provisions because the Com-
missioners believed it to be "a word without adequate definition." MODEL ACT § 101 com-
ment. Cf ABA Standards, supra note 1.
216. "An individual is not criminally responsible if at the time of the alleged offense, as a
result of mental disease or defect the individual was substantially unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of the alleged conduct." MODEL ACT § 201 (1986). Cf ABA Standards, supra
note 1, at 7-6.1(a).
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the claimed mental condition on the prosecution, and the standard of proof
is beyond a reasonable doubt.2 17 It explicitly provides that neither intoxica-
tion, the effect of drugs, nor psychopathy will constitute a basis for the de-
fense.2" 8 The Act provides procedures for examination of a defendant's
mental condition that parallel the ABA standards.2" 9 The primary depar-
ture from the approach adopted by the ABA is in the Model Act's provi-
sions for the disposition of defendants acquitted by reason of mental illness
or defect.22
A. Overview of Commitment System
The Model Act requires the court, after a criminal verdict, to order the
individual committed for evaluation. Within ninety days of this order, the
court must conduct a dispositional hearing.221 At this hearing, the rules of
civil procedure and evidence are to be applied222 and the acquittee is to be
represented by counsel, including appointed counsel if the acquittee is indi-
gent.2 23 The acquittee also has the right to the assistance of a mental health
professional.224 On these issues, the general outline of the Act parallels the
provisions of the ABA standards.225
The Model Act places the burden on the acquittee to demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he does not meet the criteria for com-
217. MODEL ACT § 702. This allocation of burdens is identical to the ABA's for those
jurisdictions that adopt the ABA Standards' preferred formulation of the nonresponsibility
defense. Cf ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-6.9(b)(i).
218. MODEL ACT § 202.
219. See MODEL ACT arts. IV, V, VI. Cf ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-3.1 to 7-3.13.
The principal difference regarding these procedures is that the ABA Standards address the
issues in much greater detail.
220. See MODEL ACT art. IX. Another difference between the two proposals is that the
ABA recommended abolishing the system of bifurcated criminal trials used by some states,
while the Model Act would permit either bifurcated or unitary trials. Compare ABA Standard
7-6.7 with MODEL ACT § 701.
221. MODEL ACT § 903(a). In contrast, the ABA recommends that the prehearing evalua-
tion be concluded within 30 days, with the hearing to be held within the next 15 days. ABA
Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.2(d). It should be noted that all time limits within both the
ABA Standards and the Model Act are bracketed, suggesting that the recommendation re-
garding time limits is less insistent than those regarding other procedural and substantive
issues.
222. MODEL ACT § 907(a), (c).
223. Id. § 907(b). The attorney who represented the defendant in the criminal trial is re-
quired, unless excused by order of the court, to represent the acquittee in the initial hearing.
Id. § 903(b).
224. Id. § 903(c). Accord ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.5.
225. Although there are no significant disagreements between the Model Act and the ABA
Standards regarding the procedures for conducting the commitment hearings, the ABA Stan-
dards address these issues in greater detail.
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mitment. 226 In contrast, the ABA standards place the burden of demon-
strating commitability on the state by clear and convincing evidence22' 7 and
the new federal statute places the burden on the acquittee by a standard that
varies with the nature of the acquittee's offense. 2 ' The Commissioners at-
tempt to justify placing the burden on the acquittee by quoting the American
Psychiatric Association's (APA) statement that "[t]heir future dangerous-
ness need not be inferred; it may be assumed, at least for a reasonable period
of time.""' 9 The Commentary to the Act also argues that even when the
acquittee's mental illness appears to be in remission, "the apparent success of
... treatment is not inconsistent with a conclusion that time may be needed
to evaluate the longer term results of such a program. "230
B. Commitment Criteria
The criteria for commitment under the Act are tied to the perceived dan-
gerousness of the individual acquittee. While other proposals contain varia-
tions based on the nature of the offense for which the individual was
acquitted,"1 the Model Act relies on the nature of the criminal act that an
acquittee is predicted to be likely to commit in the future. Thus, the trial
judge at the dispositional hearing must predict whether the acquittee will, as
a result of mental illness or defect, "commit a criminal act of violence threat-
ening another person with bodily injury or property damage," or commit
some other criminal act.' 3 ' If the acquittee is predicted likely to commit a
violent criminal offense, the court is to order him committed to "a mental
hospital or other suitable facility or into a program of conditional re-
lease.' 2 33 If the court predicts that the acquittee is likely to commit a crimi-
nal offense that is not within the "violent" category, it may order the
acquittee to report to a mental health facility "for noncustodial evaluation
and treatment and to accept nonexperimental, generally accepted medical,
psychiatric, or psychological treatment recommended by the facility.' 234
An acquittee who is not predicted likely to commit a criminal offense is not
committable under these special commitment procedures and may be com-
226. MODEL ACT § 903(d).
227. ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.4. See also supra notes 67-85 and accompanying
text.
228. See supra note 146.
229. MODEL ACT § 903 comment. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
230. MODEL AT § 903 comment.
231. See supra notes 146, 177.
232. MODEL ACT § 903(d).
233. Id. § 903(d)(2).
234. Id. § 903(d)(3).
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235mitted only under general commitment statutes.
There are several troubling questions raised by these provisions. The first
is that commitment under the special procedures is extended even to acquit-
tees whose offense did not involve an act or risk of violence. Although this
has been held to be constitutional in Jones (at least in jurisdictions where the
burden on the issue of insanity was on the defendant at the criminal trial), it
raises public policy concerns about fairness.2 36 Under the Act, the judge
may predict a future violent criminal act, and thus trigger special commit-
ment procedures, without reference to any previous criminal behavior by the
acquittee that involved or threatened violence.237 Thus a shoplifter like Mr.
Jones could be committed under the Act if the judge predicted, on whatever
basis, that he would commit a violent criminal act at some time in the
future.23 8
This illustrates a central problem with the Model Act's commitment crite-
ria: the remoteness of the prediction from any empirical basis in the acquit-
tee's past conduct. Neither the text of the Act nor its commentary offers any
guidance about how a judge is to predict whether the acquittee will commit a
future criminal act or to determine which criminal offense he is likely to
commit. It may be inferred that the court would turn to mental disability
professionals for guidance in making these predictions, but the limited abil-
ity of such professionals to predict future unspecified violent conduct must
surely be even weaker when the prediction must identify the specific future
crime.
Another difficulty is the Act's assignment of criminal offenses to the "vio-
lent" and "nonviolent" categories. The former group includes criminal acts
"of violence threatening another person with bodily injury or property dam-
age.",239 As discussed earlier, there are both constitutional and policy con-
cerns with commitment systems whose criteria include predictions of mere
235. Id. § 903(d)(1). One commendable provision of the Act is that it does not extend to
predicted dangerousness to self. See id. § 903 comment; see also Commentary to ABA Stan-
dards, supra note 1, at 7-7.4.
236. See authorities cited supra note 50.
237. "This Act contemplates that an individual remains subject to the jurisdiction of the
criminal court if the individual was found to have committed any offense, whether the offense
was a felony or a misdemeanor." MODEL ACT § 903 comment.
238. Another problem with the Act is that it specifies no time limit for the future conduct:
there is no provision that requires that the anticipated criminal offense must be predicted to
occur in the reasonably near future.
239. Id. § 903(d)(2). Property damage is undefined in the Act or the commentary, and it is
unclear whether a prediction of any future property crime, e.g., shoplifting, would be sufficient
to warrant special commitment. If so, the category of nonviolent offenses under the Act will
be limited, in large part, to so-called victimless crimes.
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dangerousness to property.24°
C. Duration of Commitment and Periodic Review
The Model Act limits the use of special commitment to the duration of the
sentence an acquittee could have received if convicted.24 ' This time limit is
established in individual cases by requiring the criminal trial court to make a
finding about the maximum sentence at the time the verdict of acquittal is
entered.242 At the expiration of the maximum sentence, the acquittee can be
committed only through use of the jurisdiction's general commitment
procedures.24 3
Acquittees are entitled to periodic review once a year of their continuing
need for special commitment. 2" As the date for periodic review approaches,
the superintendent is directed to determine whether the acquittee is cur-
rently represented by counsel; otherwise, the court will appoint counsel.245
The attorney is to consult with the acquittee and "to apply to the court for
appointment of counsel to represent the individual in a proceeding for condi-
tional release or discharge., 2 46 As noted earlier, 247 designing a mechanism
to trigger periodic review for acquittees is a difficult matter. Nevertheless,
the Model Act's provisions appear unnecessarily murky.
The Commissioners have commendably provided an opportunity for every
acquittee to consult with counsel on a periodic basis, but they have left un-
clear the relationship between the "consulting" attorney and the lawyer who
may represent the acquittee in a resulting hearing (e.g., can they be the same
lawyer?). It is also uncertain who is to make the decision whether to seek
conditional release or discharge24 8-the acquittee or one of the lawyers-or
240. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text. It appears that, in at least one respect,
the Model Act's criteria are even broader than those of the new federal statute, which refers to
serious damage to property. See supra note 146.
241. "[An acquittee] is subject to the jurisdiction of the court for a period equal to the
maximum term of imprisonment that could have been imposed for the most serious crime of
which the individual was charged but found not criminally responsible." MODEL ACT
§ 901(a) (Supp. 1986). See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
242. MODEL ACT § 902(1).
243. Id. § 901(b). The parallel provision in the ABA Standards is similar, but allows the
judge to set a duration for special commitment shorter than that maximum sentence. See
ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.7.
244. MODEL ACT § 904(b). This annual schedule is apparently an assurance that the inter-
vals between review are not excessive, because "relief under the Act is available to committed
individuals at all times." Id. § 905 comment, at 163. Petitions for habeas corpus are to be
considered as applications for relief under the Act. Id.
245. Id. § 904(c).
246. Id.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
248. There is also a provision allowing "another person acting on the individual's behalf"
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indeed whether the periodic review procedures are waivable at all.24 9 If a
lawyer is to make this determination, he or she is given no guidance on the
standard to use in making the decision.
At the periodic review hearings, the burden of persuasion rests with the
"applicant," who may be either the acquittee or someone acting on his be-
half or the superintendent. 250 The standard for review, and the alternatives
available to the court, are the same as those of the initial post-acquittal com-
mitment hearing,251 except that, on periodic review, the petitioner may also
request modification of the terms of the commitment order.252
D. Treatment Issues
There are difficulties accompanying the Act's judicial prediction of
whether the supposed future criminality of an individual acquittee is likely
to be within the category of "violent" crimes. Those acquittees determined
likely to commit violent criminal offenses can be committed to a facility for
in-patient care or for conditional release, while those predicted likely to com-
mit nonviolent crimes may only be committed for "noncustodial" treatment
involving "nonexperimental, generally accepted medical, psychiatric, or psy-
chological" methods. This limitation on special commitment 253 to prevent
future nonviolent crimes is rationalized in the commentary as required be-
cause, in such cases, "the most appropriate response may be to cause the
individual to undergo appropriate therapy on an outpatient basis. Such an
individual is not sufficiently dangerous to justify institutionalization." '254 As
a therapeutic matter, the match between judicial prediction of supposed fu-
ture crimes by an acquittee and the appropriate method of treatment may
not be perfect in every instance. A more appropriate rationale for this limi-
tation would be legal rather than medical: a prediction of nonviolent con-
duct may be an insufficient justification for the "massive curtailment of
liberty"'255 that custodial commitment represents.
to apply for conditional release, modification of commitment, or discharge of the acquittee.
Neither the text nor the commentary indicates any limitation on the persons who can exercise
this right. MODEL ACT § 905(b).
249. See generally Wexler, The Waivability of Recommitment Hearings, 20 ARIz. L. REV.
175 (1978).
250. MODEL ACT § 905(c).
251. See supra notes 226, 231-35.
252. MODEL ACT § 905(b).
253. Acquittees who are predicted likely to commit nonviolent criminal offenses might be
committable to custodial treatment under the general commitment laws of the jursidiction, as
are acquittees predicted to be dangerous to themselves. See supra note 235.
254. MODEL ACT § 903 comment.
255. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
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Aside from this limitation on the location of the commitment of "nonvio-
lent predictees," the Model Act leaves the principal decisions regarding
treatment during special commitment to the superintendent of the facility,
but requires the court's permission for those activities that might involve
issues of public safety. For example, it provides that in the absence of a
judicial order for greater restrictions, the superintendent "may determine
from time to time the nature of the constraints necessary within the [hospital
or facility] to carry out the court's order., 256 However, the Act provides
that the superintendent can authorize limited leaves from the grounds of the
facility only within the scope of the court's delegated authority. 2
57
The Model Act appears to restrict severely the acquittee's right to refuse
treatment. Both for the original noncustodial commitment of "nonviolent
predictees" and for the commitment to noncustodial commitment on peri-
251odic review, 8 the statute permits the court to order the acquittee to accept
any "nonexperimental, generally accepted medical, psychiatric, or psycho-
logical treatment recommended by the facility."' 259 The commentary notes
that "[f]ailure or refusal of the individual to comply with the order could be
an act of contempt of court. '' 2 ' This mandatory treatment stands in sharp
contrast to the right to refuse treatment that patients may possess under civil
commitment laws.26' It should also be noted that the Model Act's provision
for treatment without the patient's consent is not limited to those therapies
that are not hazardous. Thus, for example, if a particular psychotropic med-
ication were "generally accepted" and not experimental, but entailed a sub-
stantial risk to the patient,262 it could be mandated under this section for
acquittees predicted likely to commit acts that endangered neither persons
nor property.263
A final issue involving treatment is the total lack of appropriate provisions
concerning acquittees who are mentally retarded. Although the Model Act
256. MODEL ACT § 904(a).
257. Id. Cf ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.11 (requiring court order for authorized
leaves for special commitment acquittees).
258. MODEL ACT §§ 903(d)(3), 905(c)(2).
259. Id. § 905(c)(2).
260. Id. § 903 comment.
261. Cf ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-7.6 (specially committed acquittees have a right
to treatment and a right to refuse treatment comparable to general commitment patients). The
Model Act has no comparable provisions indicating whether acquittees have a right to
treatment.
262. See generally Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Re-
fuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461, 474-79 (1977).
263. Curiously, the Model Act does not indicate whether acquittees who have been pre-
dicted as likely to commit violent crimes may 'also be required to accept such treatment.
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clearly covers both "mental illness" and "defect," 2" the Act's terminology
appears to anticipate only acquittees whose mental disability arises from
mental illness. For example, there are provisions regarding "medical, psy-
chiatric, or psychological treatment, ' 265 but no mention of habilitation for
mentally retarded acquittees.266 Similarly, while there are references to
mental health professionals, there are no parallel discussions of mental retar-
dation professionals.267 Indeed, people with mental retardation are de-
scribed by the archaic and stigmatizing label "mentally defective., 268 Such
difficulties may arise from the fact that, unlike the ABA Mental Health
Standards Project,269 the Commissioners do not appear to have involved
mental retardation professionals in the development of their model statute.
E. Conclusion
The Model Act has a number of commendable features in its approach to
the commitment of insanity acquittees. The Commissioners refrained from
exercising every restrictive option left open by the Jones decision, but recom-
mended some provisions more restrictive than those in the ABA standards.
The rationalizations for some of the departures from the ABA model are not
fully persuasive, and the failure of the Model Act to address the issues of
mentally retarded defendants constitutes a serious drawback.
VII. OTHER REFORM PROPOSALS
In addition to the proposals already discussed, three other suggestions for
reform merit some discussion: the Model Penal Code, the recommendations
of the National Commission on the Insanity Defense, and Oregon's Psychi-
atric Security Review Board.
A. The Model Penal Code
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code has proven an influen-
tial guide to legislatures and courts for nearly a quarter of a century. The
264. MODEL ACT § 201.
265. See, e.g., id. § 903(d)(3).
266. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 1, at 424 n.57.
267. E.g., MODEL ACT § 501. Cf ABA Standards, supra note 1, at 7-3.12 commentary.
"In situations in which the defendant is mentally retarded, or potentially mentally retarded,
the services of a special education teacher, speech and language pathologist, or an audiologist
may be desirable to fully evaluate defendant's ability to communicate, to understand, and to
learn. [This standard] ... permits these professionals to testify as expert witnesses in appropri-
ate cases." See also Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 1, at 484-91.
268. E.g., MODEL ACT § 903(d)(3). See generally J. DUDLEY, LIVING WITH STIGMA:
THE PLIGHT OF THE PEOPLE WHO WE LABEL MENTALLY RETARDED (1983).
269. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 1, at 415.
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Code's formulation of the insanity defense gained acceptance in all of the
federal circuits and numerous states before the Hinckley controversy, and
remains the law in many states.27° Its proposals for commitment of insanity
acquittees will be reviewed only briefly in this section, since they antedate
major constitutional developments in the field of mental disability law.2 7 1
The Code requires that all insanity acquittees be committed to the custody
of the jurisdiction's Commissioner of Mental Hygiene "to be placed in an
appropriate institution for custody, care and treatment. '2 72 Acquittees can
only obtain their release by order of the court, and release can be sought by
either the Commissioner273 or the acquittee.274 Upon receiving an applica-
tion, the court is to appoint at least two psychiatrists to examine the acquit-
tee and report to the court within sixty days. Upon receipt of their report,
the court may release the acquittee summarily or order a hearing on his
continued need for confinement.275 The burden of persuasion is on the party
seeking the acquittee's release,276 and the standard is whether the acquittee
"may be discharged or released on condition without danger to himself or to
others." 277
The court need not consider an application from the acquittee until he has
been confined for at least six months, and an acquittee is not permitted to file
an application for one year after an unsuccessful petition.27' The Code pro-
vides conditional release as one of the options available to the court when it
receives an application 279 and allows the court to revoke a conditional re-
lease if, within five years of the granting of the release, the acquittee has not
fulfilled the conditions of the release and revocation is necessary for the
safety of the acquittee or others.280
270. See supra note 130.
271. The Model Penal Code was adopted in 1962 and has not been revised since. An
Explanatory Note in the 1985 edition acknowledges that there may be constitutional problems
with some of the Code's provisions regarding the commitment of acquittees.
A more recent model statute, which nevertheless predated the Hinckley controversy by sev-
eral years, was a proposal by the Mental Health Law Project. Legal Issues in State Mental
Health Care. Proposals for Change, Suggested Statute on the Insanity Defense, 2 MENTAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 651, 657-663 (1978). The provisions of the suggested statute are substan-
tially similar to those of the ABA Standards.
272. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08(1) (1985).
273. Id. § 4.08(2).
274. Id. § 4.08(5).
275. Id. § 4.08(2).
276. Id. § 4.08(3). The commentary makes clear that the standard of proof is preponder-
ance of the evidence. Id. comment, at 264.
277. Id. §§ 4.08(2), 4.08(5).
278. Id. § 4.08(5).
279. Id. § 4.08(3).
280. Id. § 4.08(4).
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The Model Penal Code represented a significant advance over previous
statutes at the time it was proposed, particularly in making the release crite-
ria turn on the question of dangerousness rather than the acquittee's "resto-
ration" to sanity,2 s8 and in providing conditional release as an alternative to
outright release or continued institutionalization. However, because of
changes in mental disability law and improvements in our understanding of
predictions of dangerousness, mental illness, and mental retardation, it offers
little useful guidance to modern legislators on the issue of the commitment
of acquittees.
The Code requires automatic commitment of all acquittees, whether their
offense involved violence or not. It appears to require confinement in an
institution for all acquittees, and thus it is ill-suited to an era in which com-
munity mental health and mental retardation services have proven to be ef-
fective. The Code requires confinement for at least six months, even if all
parties agree that the acquittee is not currently mentally disabled or danger-
ous. It places the burden of persuasion on the acquittee and fails to recog-
nize the role of mental health and mental retardation professionals other
than psychiatrists.
The standard for commitment is also problematic. It incorporates danger-
ousness to self despite the fact that acquittal has indicated nothing to distin-
guish acquittees from ordinary civil mental patients. More significantly, it
allows continued confinement upon a mere prediction of future dangerous-
ness, without a requirement that the acquittee be currently mentally ill or
mentally retarded or that the dangerousness be caused by mental disability.
Although the Code remains more reasonable on some points than a few of
the modern reform proposals, today's legislators will find more useful gui-
dance in other suggestions for change.
B. Oregon's Psychiatric Security Review Board
In 1977, the Oregon legislature enacted a new system for the commitment
and release of insanity acquittees. Its principal feature was transferring au-
thority for commitment and release decisions from the courts to a new ad-
ministrative body, the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB).2" 2
The PSRB consists of five members appointed by the governor to terms of
281. See id. comment, at 259.
282. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.327 to 161.336 (Repl. 1985); Bloom, Rogers & Manson,
After Oregon's Insanity Defense: A Comparison of Conditional Release and Hospitalization, 5
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 391 (1983); Rogers, 1981 Oregon Legislation Relating to the In-
sanity Defense and the Psychiatric Security Review Board, 18 WILLAMETTE L.J. 23 (1982);
Rogers & Bloom, Characteristics of Persons Committed to Oregon's Psychiatric Security Review
Board, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 155 (1982).
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four years and subject to confirmation by the state senate.28 3 The member-
ship includes a psychiatrist, a psychologist, an individual with experience in
the area of parole and probation, a criminal trial lawyer, and a member of
the general public. The Board may include no employee of either a district
attorney, a public defender, the Mental Health Division, or a community
mental health program.
284
When a criminal defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity,2 5 the trial
court determines "the offense of which the person otherwise would have
been convicted," '2 86 and then either orders the defendant conditionally re-
leased or transfers jurisdiction to the PSRB.2 87 The Board has jurisdiction
over special commitment of insanity acquittees who were acquitted of an
offense that was a felony or a misdemeanor causing "physical injury or risk
of physical injury to another," and who are currently "affected by mental
disease or defect" and who present a substantial danger to others. 288 The
Board's jurisdiction expires at the end of the maximum sentence the acquit-
tee could have received.289
The Board has responsibility for the periodic review of all committed ac-
quittees and for petitions for discharge, conditional release, and modifica-
tions of commitment orders. At all such hearings, the applicant carries the
burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. 290 The standard
of review is whether the acquittee is currently "affected by mental disease or
defect," and "presents a substantial danger to others which requires regular
medical care, medication, supervision or treatment., 29  There are elaborate
procedures and standards for conditional release, and an acquittee who has
283. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.385(1), (3) (Repl. 1985).
284. Id. § 161.385(2).
285. The Oregon verdict form is "guilty except for insanity" and is defined by the Model
Penal Code test. Id. § 161.295. Insanity constitutes an affirmative defense, on which the de-
fendant bears the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. §§ 161.305,
161.055.
286. Id. § 161.325(2)(a). The offense must be determined in order to calculate the maxi-
mum sentence that is the measure of the duration of the Board's jurisdiction. It is also neces-
sary to determine whether a misdemeanor was one which caused or risked physical injury to
another person. See infra note 288. For those defendants acquitted of "nonviolent" misde-
meanors, the state bears the burden on the issue of special civil commitment by a preponder-
ance of the evidence (a heavier burden for the state than Addington allows for ordinary civil
patients, but more generous to acquittees than the burden for felonies and violent misdemean-
ors). OR. REV. STAT. § 161.328 (Repl. 1985). The duration of this form of special commit-
ment also expires at the end of the maximum sentence for the acquittee's offense. Id.
287. Id. § 161.327.
288. Id. § 161.327(1).
289. Id.
290. Id. § 161.346.
291. Id. § 161.351(1).
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been on release for five years will be reviewed to determine whether he
should be discharged from the Board's jurisdiction.292 Acquittees who are
dissatisfied with the Board's disposition of their case have a right to appeal
to the courts.293
The PSRB system has attracted considerable national attention. 294 It is
particularly attractive for those states that have a substantial number of in-
sanity acquittees and prefer to have commitment and release decisions made
by an interdisciplinary body rather than judges. It should be noted that the
PSRB structure does not require that other states adopt all aspects of Ore-
gon's system, such as the allocation of burdens. Legislatures that find the
PSRB approach desirable can easily adapt both substantive and procedural
provisions from other models, such as the ABA Standards or the Uniform
Commissioners' Model Act, to be implemented by an administrative deci-
sionmaking body.
C. The National Commission on the Insanity Defense
Following the Hinckley verdict, the National Mental Health Association
organized and convened a National Commission on the Insanity Defense.
Under the chairmanship of former Senator Birch Bayh, the Commission
held public hearings in October 1982295 and issued a Report that included
recommendations concerning proposals to modify the insanity defense.296
The Report concluded that all jurisdictions should retain the insanity de-
fense, including both cognitive and volitional prongs, and place the burden
of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence on the issue of insanity on
the defendant. States were also urged to reject proposals for a "guilty but
mentally ill" verdict. 297
The Commission also recommended that all jurisdictions enact a system
of special commitment for defendants acquitted by reason of insanity of a
292. Id. § 161.351(3).
293. Id. § 161.385(8). See State v. Cooper, 37 Or. App. 443, 587 P.2d 1051 (1978) (defin-
ing an appealable PSRB order).
294. The APA has endorsed the Oregon approach. See supra note 112. The commentary
to the ABA Standards describe the PSRB as "interesting and important." ABA Standards,
supra note 1, at 7-7.8 commentary. The Uniform Law Commissioners recognized advantages
in a PSRB system, but concluded that it was "not sufficiently suited to all states to justify
including it as the standard in a model act." MODEL ACT, supra note 185, § 905 comment.
295. NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION, MYTHS AND REALITIES: HEARING
TRANSCRIPT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1983).
296. NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION, MYTHS AND REALITIES: A REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1983) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT].
297. Id. at 3.
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violent crime.29 8 The Report emphasized that "[t]he mere fact of acquittal
by reason of insanity should not, in itself, satisfy the statutory requirements
of a finding of 'dangerousness.' "299 The Commissioners concluded that the
decision about "confinement, release and approval of an appropriate treat-
ment plan" should be made by either a court or a PSRB type of quasi-judi-
cial administrative body, rather than the treatment facility itself.3" The
Report endorsed the adoption of provisions for conditional release of com-
mitted acquittees, and strongly opposed the APA's suggestion that acquit-
tees who were not receiving treatment could be confined in nontreatment
facilities. 30 1 "The Commission strongly objects to the referral of anyone not
convicted of a crime to a prison or other correctional environment.
30 2
Although the National Commission's Report does not take the form of
legislative language, and does not contain the procedural details found in
some of the other models, its recommendations concerning the commitment
of insanity acquittees are generally sensible and supportive of reasonable
reforms.
VIII. THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND SPECIAL COMMITMENT: THE
POLITICAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS
The sporadic public controversies that arise concerning the insanity de-
fense invariably lead to calls for changes in the legal rules surrounding both
its availability and its consequences. The recent uproar about the Hinckley
verdict was unusually productive in this regard. It inspired the ABA, the
APA, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
and Congress to abandon the volitional prong of the insanity defense. It
gave impetus to the movement to adopt "guilty but mentally ill" statutes in a
number of states. And it engendered a flurry of competing proposals to re-
form commitment procedures for acquittees.3 °3
The commitment proposals merit cautious evaluation before they are
adopted. One reason for care is the need to protect the public from the
potential violent acts of acquittees, but this concern will already be accom-
modated by the political impulses that occasion consideration of the topic.
A concern that is unlikely to have its own political constituency is the
need for the fair treatment of acquittees. On the whole, this is a relatively
298. Id. at 37.
299. Id. at 38.
300. Id.
301. See supra notes 122-27.
302. REPORT, supra note 296, at 39.
303. See also Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 528
(1985).
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unattractive group. However, individual instances of injustice, such as that
visited upon Michael Jones by the laws of the District of Columbia and the
United States Supreme Court, should always be a source of concern. Thus,
proposed systems of special commitment should be inspected closely to eval-
uate their provisions for identifying and correcting instances of unjustified
deprivation of liberty. In their haste to assure the public that no violent
individual will ever be released, some current proposals fail to allow a fair
determination of committability for those acquittees who, realistically
viewed, pose no substantial danger to anyone.
A somewhat less obvious concern, also lacking a ready-made political con-
stituency, is the impact of proposed changes on the structure of mental
health law in general. A version of this concern has already surfaced: the
argument that special commitment of acquittees must be made more restric-
tive because it is the only source of reassurance sufficient to "save" the in-
sanity defense from abolition.3" This view is commendable in its attempt to
accommodate two different legal structures in a politically palatable way.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether this perspective has ordered its
political and legal priorities correctly.
Upholding systems of automatic commitment that require acquitted per-
sons to prove that their confinement is unlawful must, of necessity, offend
accepted principles of equal protection and procedural due process. What
we know about acquittees, even those acquitted of violent offenses, will not
support the conclusion that it is unnecessary to inquire into their current
mental condition or prospective dangerousness. The likelihood that they are
committable at the time of acquittal or at any subsequent periodic review is
not so certain that we can dispense with hearings at which the state must
prove its case in order to deprive them of liberty. The state can offer no
persuasive justification for continuing them in special confinement when
their sentence would have elapsed, because at that point they are indistin-
guishable from ordinary civil patients or mentally disabled convicts who
have completed their sentence. The Supreme Court in Jones twisted previ-
ously clear doctrines of equal protection and due process to reach the con-
clusion that the Constitution provides few obstacles to the confinement of
insanity acquittees.
This pliant view of the Constitution's requirements may well eventually
affect the rights of mentally disabled people who have never been accused of
crimes. Attempts during the last decade and a half to construct a general
304. See supra note 85. A similar view that harshness in the design of post-acquittal com-
mitment will enhance the palatability of the defense to both jurors and the general public is
offered by the commentary to the MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 comment (1985).
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civil commitment system that protects the rights of individuals are
threatened by the possible extensions of the Jones holding and its dicta. In-
deed, by relying on such an insubstantial empirical foundation in its attempt
to differentiate acquittees from other patients, the Court may have begun an
erosion of the equal protection and due process principles it purported to
distinguish in Jones.
The Court's treatment of the disposition issues raises anew the issue of the
wisdom of retaining the insanity defense itself. If the price for keeping the
defense is a system of special commitment that excludes procedural protec-
tions in order to insure invariable long-term or permanent confinement, it is
not clear whether this is preferable to a system that convicts some individu-
als who are currently eligible for the defense. It may be claimed that justice
is served because these individuals are not being punished. But the insis-
tence upon, or acquiescence in, procedures which assure that acquittees will
not reenter our communities regardless of their current mental condition
suggests that the distinction between automatic special commitment and
punishment by incarceration3 0 5 is almost purely metaphysical. Ultimately,
such semantic camouflage may be the price we will have to pay to protect
harmless general mental patients from the unnecessary confinement that so-
ciety inevitably will demand if we attempt to equate the treatment of these
two groups of patients.
If these pessimistic speculations are correct, we may have to reconsider
the draconian "special commitment" proposed as a barricade against the
assault on the insanity defense. It is not clear whether some residuum of the
defense is constitutionally required.3 °6 If legislatures are free to abolish or
greatly restrict the insanity defense, we may be confronted with the necessity
of political triage. It is not unquestionably obvious that the retention of the
defense in its current form is worth the price if that price involves the ero-
sion of the rights of general commitment patients.
Dr. Alan Stone has suggested that these recent developments have arisen
because "[p]erhaps for the first time in its history the insanity defense has
305. This argument loses force, of course, when the alternative to acquittal by reason of
insanity is the death penalty. Severe mental disability, however, may be a mitigating factor in
determining whether the death penalty is to be applied. See ABA Standard, supra note 1, at 7-
9.3; Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 1, at 471-73.
306. See State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984) (holding that it is not); Sinclair v.
State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) (holding that it is). For a sampling of the policy
debate on the proposed abolition of the defense, see Commentary to ABA Standards, supra
note 1, at 7-6.1; Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194 (1983);
Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"--Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963);
Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719 (1973).
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bite."3 7 The essence of the defense is the declaration that an individual
found to meet the test is acquitted. The debate over automatic special com-
mitment suggests that we don't really mean it, at least for some acquittees.
If we don't really mean it, perhaps we should say so.
Fear of the future acts of acquittees and our impulses for retribution for
acts that harmed society come into conflict with our moral predisposition
that people should not be punished for acts that were not their "fault." But
there is more than one way to address our societal ambivalence about
whether insanity acquittees should be punished. Distorting the constitu-
tional principles and public policy considerations that place boundaries on
the state's civil commitment power is an unacceptable means of sweeping the
insanity defense debate under the rug.
IX. CONCLUSION
There are sound public policy reasons for considering a reform of state
laws concerning commitment of insanity acquittees. A balanced system of
special commitment can protect the public safety and, at the same time, give
acquittees a fair hearing on their current mental condition and continuing
need for confinement. Special commitment can also insulate general com-
mitment laws from political pressures that can arise from the prospect of the
possible release of notorious insanity acquittees.
Some of the recent proposals for reform contain features that are ill-con-
sidered. Commitment systems that rely on presumptions of dangerousness
that are not empirically justifiable should not be enacted. Similarly, commit-
ment on the basis of fear of future property offenses that do not endanger the
safety of others is unacceptable. Some of the proposals fail to address ade-
quately the problems presented by mentally retarded defendants who are
acquitted by reason of mental nonresponsibility. The suggestion that acquit-
tees can be confined in prisons or prison-like settings if treatment is not being
provided is inconsistent with any reasonable, nonpunitive conception of the
insanity defense.
Several of the recently proposed model reforms, however, have features
that commend them to the attention of state legislators. The Oregon model
of using a Psychiatric Security Review Board instead of courts in making
commitment and release decisions will be attractive to legislators in some
states. Whether a state chooses to use judges or an administrative body to
make these decisions, it may find that the ABA Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards represent a balanced approach to the problem of commit-
ting insanity acquittees.
307. A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY: ESSAYS AND ANALYSIS 141 (1984).
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